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The United States has sought a willing regional actor to carry a larger share of the 
burden to maintain Southeast Asian security and stability—without diminishing its 
regional leadership role—since assuming the position from the British after WWII.  In 
1999, Australia led a peacekeeping force into East Timor, ostensibly fulfilling a long held 
desire by the United States to reduce its worldwide commitments.  However, as other 
international organizations have demonstrated, the United States is obliged to accept a 
disproportionate burden of providing the public good of international security and 
stability.  In Southeast Asia, where post-colonial states such as Indonesia are narrowly 
avoiding disintegration, the United States as the regional hegemon, must recognize its 
responsibility to carry a disproportionate share of the costs to maintain stability.  In 
endeavoring to replicate the approach to the East Timor crisis and use it as a model for 
future peacekeeping scenarios, the United States will not consistently find a regional 
actor to duplicate the role Australia performed.  Without U.S. leadership, and absent a 
UN force or regional actor capable of quickly deploying a peacekeeping force to a rapidly 
deteriorating situation, it is implausible that a comparable future crisis will be resolved 
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The most plausible near-term threat to Southeast Asian security and stability is 
internal state failure and its potential for transnational escalation.  Unfortunately, “no 
framework exists in Asia to cope with civil wars or massive domestic violence.”1  The 
United Nations, under increasing international demands to intervene without the 
appropriate financial or military means to do so, has sought regional actors throughout 
the world to respond to civil unrest, particularly ones involving humanitarian disasters.  
Complicating this predicament is the United States’ desire to reduce its global military 
commitments by requiring—particularly during the War Against Terror—regional actors 
or organizations, historically considered free riders, to lead and resolve these crises with 
limited U.S. support.  This was modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East Timor, 
henceforth the East Timor Model (ETM).  The ETM is assessed to have the following 
five characteristics: 
1. An internal security crisis is capable through unrestrained escalation to 
diminish regional stability.  Thus, the situation would call for a legitimate, UN 
Security Council mandated international intervention conducted by a 
multilateral coalition of the willing.  
2. Peace operations provide a “collective good” to countries that have interests in 
the region by maintaining peace and stability. 
3. A regional actor—which has been a free rider upon the United States—is now 
willing and capable to lead a peacekeeping operation 
4. Due to geographic proximity and the increasing interdependence of global 
economies, regional actors have a larger interest than the United States in 
maintaining regional peace and security. 
5. The United States is willing to subordinate its military forces under the 
direction of a foreign commander. 
The intent of this thesis is to demonstrate that the absence of one of the characteristics of 
the model will prevent it from being replicated in a future Southeast Asian peacekeeping 
operation (PKO).  Although the first characteristic has not always been a requirement for 
international intervention, Kosovo being the most recent example, a UN mandate is the 
                                                 
1 Shiro Harada and Akihiko Tanaka, “Regional Arrangements, the United Nations and Security in 
Asia,” in Muthiah Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi eds., International Security Management and the United 
Nations, (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999), 343. 
1 
international and Southeast Asia norm established for conducting multilateral PKOs.  
Peace operations will provide a collective good for a region if international intervention 
prevents escalation and maintains regional stability, and therefore the second 
characteristic is assumed accurate for future PKOs.  However, this thesis will 
demonstrate that the third characteristic of the ETM is untenable in the Asia-Pacific, thus 
making the model flawed.  Finding a willing and capable actor amongst East Asian states 
and regional intergovernmental organizations—which historically expected the United 
States to provide the military forces to maintain stability—will not be found so long as 
the United States continues as the regional hegemon.  Consequently, absent this actor, 
this flaw prevents the ETM from successfully and routinely being replicated and 
therefore implemented into a future Southeast Asian PKO, despite the apparent success 
of Australia’s leadership role in East Timor.2  The fourth characteristic of the ETM 
assumes intuitively that as the Asian economies grow increasingly interdependent and by 
the sheer proximity to a regional crisis, the countries of the Asia-Pacific will have a 
greater interest in maintaining stability than the United States.  Finally—while often a 
contentious domestic issue within the United States—it is not forbidden by law or absent 
historic precedence to place U.S. forces under the command of a foreign military officer.  
Therefore, characteristic five will not be an impediment to replicating the ETM. 
Thus, regrettably for Southeast Asia (SEA) and the ETM, there are no suitable 
mechanisms or actors in the region capable of substituting in the United States leadership 
role in a large-scale intervention—as desired under the third characteristic of the East 
Timor Model—for two reasons.  First, cooperative security, embraced by the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), is 
only useful for interstate conflict avoidance and transnational concerns—not internal 
conflict resolution.  Secondly, the region’s middle powers and current free riders (Japan, 
Australia, and China) are unable to intervene in a timely fashion under current domestic 
and international political conditions, nor do they have sufficient military capabilities to 
lead such an operation independently.  Accordingly, this thesis argues that the United 
                                                 
2 The intent of this thesis is not to dispute or conclude when it is appropriate or authorized for either 
the United States, the UN, or another regional actor, to intervene, but whether the latter of these are able 
politically and militarily. 
2 
States will not routinely find a willing and capable actor within the region to lead PKOs 
and reduce its current obligation.  Rather, this thesis demonstrates that the United 
States—as the regional hegemon and leader—will be required to carry a disproportionate 
burden to maintain regional peace while the other actors will continue to be free riders.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1.  Security in Southeast Asia 
If the twentieth century might be called the century of totalitarianism, with 
a barbed-wired fence as its symbol, so the twenty-first century may one 
day be known as the century of the mini-state, its emblem the mass grave 
pit surrounded by onlookers in breathing masks.3 
 Mohammed Ayoob argues that the security problematic of Third World States 
has domestic, regional, and global dimensions, but that the “primary layer that flavors the 
entire cake is the domestic one.”4  Brian Job goes further, arguing that internal threat to 
and from the regime in power, not external threats to existence of the nation-state, are the 
primary if not the exclusive security concern of the Third World States.5  Ayoob argues 
in a separate article that two realities of the current international scene must be reviewed 
to accurately understand the reality confronting the 21st century.  The first is the fact that 
the majority of conflicts since the end of World War II have been located in the Third 
World.  The second is the equally unassailable fact that most conflicts in the Third World 
have been primarily intrastate in character or have possessed a substantial intrastate 
dimension, even if they appear to the outside observer to be interstate conflicts.6  
Scholars, including Kalevi J. Holsti and Evan Luard, have documented the validity of 
these arguments through empirical data.7  These two trends—concentration of conflicts in 
the Third World and the internal nature and source of conflict—have been exacerbated by 
ar and recently confirmed by the figures presented in the the conclusion of the Cold W                                                 
3 Arnold Beichman, “The New World Disorder,” Hoover Digest 2000 No.2 Hoover Institution.  Found 
online at: http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/002/beichman.html. 
4 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and 
the International System, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), cited in Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 647. 
5 Brian Job, The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1992), cited in Alagappa, 647. 
6 Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 
(Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 2001), 127. 
7 Cited in Ayoob (2001), 127. 
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SIPRI Yearbook 2001.  The Yearbook demonstrates that, of the twenty-five major armed 
conflicts around the world in 2000, all but two were intrastate in character.  Accordingly, 
within Southeast Asia, internal conflicts, not interstate conflict, have been the prominent 
feature of the Asian political landscape.8  After World War II, Asia has witnessed 
numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coup d’etat, regional rebellions, and 
revolutions, and innumerable racial, ethnic, and religious riots and unrests.9  Thus, “if 
nationalism was the most powerful and destructive political force of the twentieth 
century, subnationalism threatens to be the bloodiest force of this century.”10  This is 
demonstrated explicitly in the post-colonial states of Southeast Asia, particularly 
Indonesia.   
“Armed conflict between Southeast Asian countries—except for small-scale 
border conflicts—is only a remote possibility.”11  Of much greater security concern are 
political and social instability within the ASEAN countries themselves, and the risk that 
serious upheaval or fragmentation, especially in Indonesia, will infect other parts of 
Southeast Asia.  Internal conflicts within ASEAN states have been perceived and 
addressed by the involved governments as threats to not only their domestic security but 
also their national security.  Muthia Alagappa argues that internal security concerns in 
Asia can be traced to conflict over two issues—national identity and political legitimacy.  
A key consequence of the Southeast Asian colonial period was the establishment of 
Asian political units out of multiethnic “territorialisms.”12  The inheritance of colonial 
boundaries established the idea of a nation in these former colonies, which melded 
multiple ethnicities together, often without the traditional sense of either civic 
nationalism or the political legitimacy to effectively prevent the potential for state failure.  
                                                 
8 Muthiah Alagappa, “Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations,” 615, in Muthiah 
Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1998). 
9 Ibid., 616. 
10 Beichman, 4. 
11 Paul Dibb, “Indonesia: The Key to South-East Asia’s Security,” International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 
4, 2001, 829.  
12 Territorialisms is a word utilized by Alagappa to describe countries that are post-colonial with 
inherited borders as defined by the former colonial rulers. 
4 
This incessant and continual confrontation, with the potential for state-failure, explains a 
significant and often overlooked way towards explaining Asian security practices. 
Alagappa counters both Mohammed Ayoob’s and Brian Job’s views as having 
limited analytical use in Southeast Asia for three reasons.  First, the Asian countries, 
barring Japan, are far from prototypical Third World states as described by these 
scholars.  Secondly, Asian states are concerned not only with internal threats but also 
with international threats.  A third limitation of the weak-state thesis is its inability to 
accommodate change in one or more attributes of statehood.  Alagappa argues that there 
has been a substantial strengthening of Asian national identities, thus limiting the use of 
Ayoob and Job’s theses.  Alagappa’s argument that Southeast Asian nations should not 
be contemporarily classified as Third World has merit.  However, one cannot ignore the 
fact that internal ethnic and sub-national conflict consistently plagues Southeast Asian 
states for reasons indistinguishable from Third World nation-state clashes.  Thus, whether 
Southeast nations are defined as Third World or not, Ayoob’s and Job’s thesis provides a 
plausible theoretical framework to understand and predict a reasonable likelihood of 
internal state failure within Southeast Asia in the near future.   
Nevertheless, multiple academic sources propose that there are no major military 
conflicts or immediate, ominous threats in Southeast Asia.13  Richard Ellings and 
Sheldon Simon argue that there is relative optimism for the future, but events outside the 
region have paradoxically increased the insecurity in the region—the rise of China and 
the end of the Cold War, which concluded America’s justification for a strong military 
presence in the region.  In Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000, the contributors to this 
collection also argue that while there is reason for optimism, there are signs that regional 
stability in Asia Pacific is fragile.  They refer to the growing difficulties in large-power 
relationships, particularly in regards to China and the United States.  In RAND’s The 
United States and Asia, the authors specifically list as one of the region’s concerns, 
besides the hotspots of North Korea and Taiwan, the disintegration of Indonesia.14  
                                                 
13 Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon Simon, Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium,  (Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1996). 
5 
14 Zalmay Khalizad, David T. Orletsky, Johnathan D. Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel M. Rabasa, 
David A. Shlapak, Abraqm N. Shulsky, and Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New 
U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). 
However, the study does not offer a U.S. strategy that would entail resolving internal 
conflict in Indonesia militarily—the fourth most populous country in the world, with 
significant U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Australian interests.  While it appears that the 
RAND study clearly intends to focus U.S. strategy on future threats, it appears that the 
U.S. government, in agreement with this thesis, is concerned about Southeast Asia, as 
evident in the remarks given by Richard N. Haass, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. 
Department of State in June 2001:  
In Southeast Asia and the neighborhood near Australia, the odds of any 
two nations going to war are decidedly low.  The circumstances under 
which militaries are going to be asked to undertake operational tasks are 
more likely to be in situations other than war -- non-combatant 
evacuations, humanitarian relief and disaster assistance, peacekeeping 
operations and anti-piracy activities.15  
Thus, while the literature on Asian security demonstrates the greater concern of 
individual countries for internal security over the rising threat of China or the re-
militarization of Japan, no study provides a comprehensive analysis to evaluate the 
potential problems with resolving such conflict when diplomatic means fail.   
Throughout the globe, both collective and cooperative security have become the 
core of conflict prevention, and in this respect, Southeast Asia is no different.  However, 
regional security cooperation is new to Asia.  Multilateral cooperation and international 
law were not features of historic interstate systems in Asia.  Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia has been directed toward building trust and confidence among member states.  
Cooperative security in Southeast Asia has been successfully exercised through ASEAN 
and ARF.  However, “of the security concepts in use in Asia-Pacific security discourse, 
one of the most ambiguous is cooperative security” and “now the most commonly 
invoked security concept in the …region.”16  Thus, defining cooperative security is 
subject to interpretation.  Nonetheless, the concept is credited with playing a significant 
role in Southeast Asian conflict prevention, but it has had no success in intrastate conflict 
                                                 
15 U.S. State Department Perspective On The Australian Alliance, June 29, 2001.  This is the text of 
remarks made by Richard N. Haass, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State, for the 
conference "The U.S.-Australian Alliance in an East Asian Context" at the University of Sydney.  
16 David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2002) 98. 
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resolution.  Unfortunately, “conflict containment and conflict termination are to be 
handled outside the ARF by appropriate states and arrangements.”17  Thus, ASEAN 
through ARF “has contributed much more to conflict avoidance among its members than 
to conflict resolution.”18  Paradoxically, although cooperative security through ASEAN 
has successfully prevented interstate conflict, it has no capability to prevent intra-state 
conflict. 
2. The UN: The Regionalization of Peacekeeping 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan says PKOs have sometimes been compared to 
a volunteer fire department.  “But that description is too generous,” he adds.  Every time 
there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can 
start dousing the flames.”19  Since the end of the Cold War, the international environment 
has seen a significant increase in the demand and need for UN peacekeeping forces.  
Because of weak mandates, shortage of funds, ill-trained soldiers, paucity of troops, 
absence of basic military equipment and mismanagement at the ground level, the PKOs 
have often resulted in disaster as witnessed in Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Bosnia and Rwanda.  Because of these failures, the UN convened 
an independent panel, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, to review the causes.  What was to 
become known as the Brahimi Report was a seventy-page report that explicitly cited the 
failures of the UN.  An excerpt is offered below: 
The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order "to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”  Meeting this 
challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very 
significant degree, it is the yardstick with which the Organization is 
judged by the peoples it exists to serve.  Over the last decade, the United 
Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no 
better today.  Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, 
significant institutional change and increased financial support, the 
United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping 
and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming 
months and years.  [emphasis added]  There are many tasks which United 
Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many 
                                                 
17 Muthia Alagappa “Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations,” 637. 
18 David B. H. Denoon and Evelyn Colbert, “Challenges for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN),” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4, Winter 1998-1999, 506. 
19 Thalif Deen, “Briefing: UN Peacekeeping,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 34, Issue No. 19, 8 
November 2000. 
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places they should not go.  But when the United Nations does send its 
forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering 
forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat 
them.20 
The Brahimi report describes both the causes and solutions to the problems.  
However, for political reasons there is not a feasible short-term solution to convince 
contributing countries whose payments are in arrears to provide the funding they are 
assessed.  Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the forces supplied to the UN for 
PKOs are from the poorer nations, which provide soldiers more for financial than for 
ideological or political reasons.  Each soldier is paid a little less that $1,000 a month, an 
amount equivalent to more than twice the salaries paid in most home countries.21  Those 
countries that have the best-trained forces, generally from the West, avoid a key role in 
UN or regional peacekeeping unless it has a bearing on national interests.   
Consider the list of the top-ten countries providing forces to UN peacekeeping 
operations as of Jan 31, 200222: 
Country Total Contributions Military and Civilian Police 
1. Bangladesh 6,024 
2.         Pakistan 5,500 
3.         Nigeria 3,505 
4.         India 2,885 
5.         Ghana 2,465 
6.         Jordan 1,947 
7.         Kenya 1,802 
8.         Australia 1,548 
9.         Ukraine 1,542 
10.       Portugal 1,139 
          
Excepting Australia, which is still heavily committed to East Timor, noticeably 
absent are those countries with the best-funded and trained militaries in the world.  The 
United States is eighteenth, while traditional peacekeepers like Canada have significantly 
                                                 
20 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, found online at: 
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. 
21 Deen, 23. 
22 United Nations Peacekeeping homepage, found online at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/31-01-02.pdf. 
8 
reduced their commitments under fiscal constraints and are now 32nd, providing only 305 
personnel.   
The Brahimi report lays out a corrective plan to reinvigorate UN peace 
operations, and “leader after leader took the rostrum to give explicit or implicit support to 
the Brahimi prescriptions.  Among them was President Clinton, who called for a greater 
UN role in humanitarian interventions.”23  As Michael Hirsh critically points out:  “that 
to think these recommendations will be carried out, now or ever, is to strain common 
sense to the breaking point.”24  He goes further to state that demands for a more robust 
UN force, including combat-ready “stand-by” units, have existed for decades, and that is 
little hope that they will evolve today.  The peacekeeping recommendations are estimated 
to cost $200 million a year to implement while outstanding contributions as of 31 
December 2001 still hovered $1.9 billion dollars.25  The Brahimi Report paints a bleak 
picture and clearly demonstrates causes behind the UN failure in peacekeeping 
operations.  Disappointingly, the report cannot miraculously provide a means to rectify 
the problems it describes. 
The solution, at least in the interim to overcome this problem is the emergence of 
UN-sanctioned “regio-cops.”26  This solution suggests that the UN would become the 
legitimizer of regionally organized peacekeeping forces, as in the first characteristic of 
the East Timor Model.  This has international legal legitimacy due to Chapter VIII, 
Article 52 of the United Nations which states: “The Security Council shall encourage the 
development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements 
or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by 
reference from the Security Council.”  Regional solutions to civil conflict resolution have 
been utilized sparingly to date.  Some have argued, however, that the use of UN approved 
regional peacekeepers will help solve the critical problem of keeping humanitarian 
intervention aligned with national interests.  It is assumed therefore, that countries, who 
                                                 
23 Michael Hirsh, “Calling All Regio-Cops: Peacekeeping’s Hybrid Future,” Foreign Affairs, 
November/December 2000, 3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 United Nations Peacekeeping homepage, found online at: 
http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf 
26 Hirsh, 5. 
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are “coalitions of the willing,”27 particularly as regionalism creates closer and more 
economically interdependent economies would have an interest to “police their 
backyard.”  Finally, regionalism addresses another failure recognized by the Brahimi 
Report—how to command a multi-national polyglot force of nations that do not share 
common military customs and are culturally diverse.  While regional peacemaking 
sounds good on paper, few regions have the capacity, whether financially, militarily or 
politically, to conduct such an operation.  This is particularly evident in Southeast Asia.  
Consequently, this thesis shows that the convergence of regionalization by the UN and an 
attempt to utilize the ETM would leave Southeast Asia without a mechanism or an actor 
to lead and subsequently assist in solving a domestic conflict. 
A preliminary analysis would suggest that the East Timor intervention of 1999 
marks a departure for SEA.  Firstly, the humanitarian issue was the chief rationale offered 
for the deployment of INTERFET.  With respect to this issue, this thesis will argue that 
missions like INTERFET—led by the lone regional actor willing to lead such an 
operation, Australia—was an anomaly, not a model for the future.  Secondly,  “the 
actions of the Australia-led coalition do not indicate a wider regional acceptance of the 
norm of humanitarian intervention.28  This thesis will demonstrate Australia cannot 
militarily and politically lead a larger or distant operation like UNTAC in Cambodia, 
which required vast numbers of troops and equipment.  Consequently, this thesis also 
concludes that neither ASEAN nor other regional powers—namely China and Japan—
has the current capability both militarily and politically to intercede without large-scale 
US involvement and leadership.  Furthermore—as demonstrated by two books intended 
as policy recommendations for the Bush Administration—the approach of employing 
regional actors without the means to conduct such operations would validate Southeast 
Asian countries’ concerns that United States policy towards their region continues to be 
ad hoc and reactive rather than reflecting a policy with strategic focus.29  As a result, this 
                                                 
27 “The UN’s Mission Impossible,” The Economist, August 5, 2000. 
28 James Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1, Spring 
2001, 127. 
29 For further information please refer to: J. Robert Kerrey, Chair, Robert A. Manning, Project 
Director, The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration, (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2001) and Tadashi Yamamoto, Pranee Thiparat, Abul Ahsan, America’s 
Role in Asia: Asian Views, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2001). 
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thesis will argue that were the United States to employ the East Timor Model under the 
existing regional conditions it would further demonstrate a lack of U.S. commitment to 
the region and have enormous implications for future regional security issues. 
3. US Policy Towards Peacekeeping Operations 
In the aftermath of the disastrous U.S. Army Ranger mission in Somalia in 1993, 
President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 on May 3, 1994, (PDD-
25).30  This directive was a policy directive outlining the administration's position on 
reforming multilateral peace operations.  The result of a 14-month inter-agency review of 
U.S. policy regarding multinational peacekeeping operations, PDD-25 sets forth several 
stringent requirements that must be satisfied before the United States will participate in 
international peacekeeping operations and suggests ways in which the U.N. could 
improve its management of such operations.  This directive, and its affect upon U.S. 
involvement in PKOs became known as the “Clinton Doctrine.”  In simplified terms, it 
was to clarify when the United States would support and involve itself militarily in 
PKOs.  The result was a policy of attempting to reduce the involvement of U.S. combat 
forces in every PKO that evolved, and suggested an alternative in which the United States 
would support with other than intervention forces, such as logistics, communications and 
financial support.  The policy approach was utilized in Kosovo and, of significance for 
this thesis, in East Timor. 
The administration of President George W. Bush, while criticizing many elements 
of PDD 25, agrees with the general notion that the United States should distance itself 
from the role of “global policeman” and hand over responsibility for regional security to 
friendly and capable countries.  Condoleeza Rice, in an essay written during George W. 
Bush’s campaign in the summer of 2000, criticized the Clinton administration for over-
deploying military forces without regard for vital U.S. interests.  As a solution to 
preventing the military from being involved wherever a civil or humanitarian conflict 
erupts, she suggests that a regional actor might better carry out these tasks.  Utilizing East 
Timor as a model for future interventions to preserve the U.S. military from being 
deployed to every peacekeeping and humanitarian crisis, she recommended a policy that 
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views the capabilities of the regional actors in Asia-Pacific, as she would like them to be 
rather than what they are.  In statements to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
January 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell made the Bush Administration’s stance on 
regional engagement is Southeast Asia clear.  He said the United States would prefer to 
let regional security groupings deal with regional security problems, “rather than America 
feeling it has to respond to every 911 call that’s out there.”  In regards to Southeast Asia, 
Powell’s comments emphasized the role for Australia.  “We can’t do it alone,” Powell 
said.   
We need friends and allies to help us as we look at the security challenges 
in the new century.  In the Pacific, for example, we are very, very pleased 
the Australia, our firm ally, has [shown] keen interest in what’s been 
happening in Indonesia.  And so we will coordinate our policies, but let 
our ally, Australia, take the lead as they have so well in that troubled 
country.31  
Consequently, for the purpose of this research, this thesis will pre-suppose that 
this will be the attempted policy approach the Bush Administration will adhere to when 
considering future peacekeeping operations.  
The attempt to reduce the financial and military toll associated with being a 
regional hegemon is not new to U.S. policy and revisits a long held approach to 
American foreign policy which began in East Asia with the Guam Doctrine.  Historically, 
in a unipolar world, the reigning global policeman has attempted to prevent “imperial 
overreach” and reduce the economic and military drain which ultimately led to the 
demise of both the Romans and the British.  In similar fashion, the United States has 
attempted to reduce its military commitments throughout the world by asking other actors 
to contribute a larger portion of providing the public and collective good of 
peacekeeping, allowing it to retire from being the world’s policeman.  Akin to the 
international relations theory accredited to Charles P. Kindleberger, and based on 
organizational theories of Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, hegemonic stability 
theory proposed that the world needs a hegemon to maintain a stable liberal global 
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economy.32  According to this theory, however, the system is plagued by the “free rider 
syndrome.”  Accordingly, smaller or less powerful countries do not bear a proportionate 
contribution to maintain the stability of the system.  Consequently, the hegemon, the 
United States must carry a disproportionate share of the costs.  This appears to be the 
case in the Asia-Pacific, whereas the United States has historically carried a 
disproportionate share of maintaining regional stability a “collective or public good.”  
However, according to Joseph Nye,  
To a large extent maintaining international order is a public good—
something everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to 
others.  A small country can benefit from peace in its region, freedom of 
the seas, suppression of terrorism, open trade, control of infectious 
diseases or stability in financial markets at the same time as the United 
States does without diminishing the benefits to the United States or 
others.33 
Thus, all the ‘members’ of East Asia’s regional society benefit and share the 
“collective good” of stability the United States provides, albeit at a higher cost to the 
United States, the region’s hegemon. 
Without question stability is important in East Asia, a region in which trade with 
the United States continues to grow, and consequently the United States benefits if it 
maintains it.  However, this thesis will demonstrate that only the United States, as a large 
beneficiary to Southeast Asian stability, and in accordance with the theories of Charles 
Kindleberger and Mancur Olson, must continue to bear the disproportionate share of 
leadership roles in future PKOs in the region.  Alternatively, the United States must 
accept the responsibility to lead, which allows others to become, ‘free riders,’ because 
“the alternative is that the collective bus does not move at all.”34  Stated more succinctly, 
if the United States does not accept the responsibility to lead the operation, it is highly 
unlikely another actor—China, Japan, Australia, or ASEAN—will be willing to 
                                                 
32 For further information consider the following:  Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), Charles Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in 
the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly, 
Volume 25, Issue 2, June 1981, 242-254 and Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic 
Theory of Alliances,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 42, No. 3, August 1966, 266-279. 
33 Joseph Nye, “The American National Interests and Global Public Goods,” International Affairs, 
Vol.  78, No. 2, 2002, 239. 
34 Ibid., 240. 
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contribute a larger percentage of the cost to provide a collective good without receiving a 
larger fraction of that good. 
4. Methodology 
Having demonstrated the likelihood of internal state failure within Southeast Asia 
which would require international intervention, this thesis will utilize a case study 
method to evaluate the current and potential for the regional and international actors to 
stop acting as “free riders” and accept a larger role in conflict resolution within Southeast 
Asia through PKOs.  Utilizing primarily secondary sources and limited primary sources, 
the thesis will assess the political and military limitations of ASEAN, Japan, Australia, 
and China, to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of these actors to participate 
unilaterally or multilaterally in a Southeast Asian peacekeeping operation or 
humanitarian intervention.  The selection of these countries is based on their individual 
strategic interests, for both security and economic reasons, in Southeast Asia.  This does 
not assume that other countries, particularly South Korea would not to contribute to a 
Southeast Asian PKO.  The Republic of Korea (ROK) is restricted from a large-scale 
contribution of troops and the assumption of a leadership role so long as the Democratic 
People’s Republic (DPRK) provides a significant threat to the Korean peninsula.  Thus, 
after making such an assessment, the thesis will conclude that the East Timor Model 
(ETM) is an idealistic policy approach, and will not successfully be implemented until 
the United States is willing to shirk from the responsibility as the regional leader and 
hegemon of Southeast Asia. 
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II.  AUSTRALIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, Australia undertook its most significant military operations since the 
Vietnam War.  Australia’s leadership role of the multinational force—INTERFET—
ostensibly fulfilled the role the United States and the United Nations had sought.  Even 
though Australia played this role in East Timor, it would be overly simplistic to assume 
that it will fulfill this role in the future and fulfill the third characteristic of the ETM.  It 
would appear, both from the accolades lauded upon Australia by the United States and 
the UN and their own “back patting,” that Australia is a willing leader for future 
peacekeeping missions in Southeast Asia.  However, as for any country, Australia has 
both political and military limitations that would preclude automatically assuming this 
leadership role.  To understand this prospective role of Australia, a review of its foreign 
policy, with emphasis on relations with the United States and Indonesia, will be covered 
in this chapter.  After completing this, a careful examination of Australia’s role in the 
East Timor crisis must be accomplished to fully understand why it led International Force 
East Timor (INTERFET).  Lastly, to evaluate Australia’s military capabilities for future 
regional peacekeeping operations, particularly as a leader, this chapter will portray the 
military limitations this middle power confronts.  Ultimately what this chapter will 
demonstrate is that Australia’s leadership in East Timor, although deemed a success, 
ostensibly exposed Australia’s political and military limitations to act in a similar 
function in the future and raises questions about the validity of Australia fulfilling the 
third characteristic of the ETM consistently.  Consequently, this chapter argues the model 
(ETM) is in actuality an anomaly that will not be repeated unless identical parameters are 
replicated.   
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
Australia is a European country in Asia.  Since 1901, the federation has attained 
its security, based on its unique situation, by fostering relationships with both the United 
Kingdom until WWII and with the United States thereafter.  Australia, as a member of 
the Commonwealth, looked initially to Great Britain to fulfill its security requirements.  
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“Indeed, prior to the end of World War II, foreign policy, if it existed at all, merely 
revolved around Australia’s supporting and endorsing initiatives that came out of 
London.”35  While policymakers in Canberra were prepared to differ with the British on 
substantive issues such as immigration, relations with Japan, and regional security, it was 
always in context of influencing Imperial policy and rarely, if ever, in support of creating 
independent Australian policy designs.36  Consequently, Australia had a slow 
development of an independent foreign policy, despite an interest otherwise, particularly 
in regards to issues regarding Asia-Pacific.  Ultimately during the first four decades of 
the federation’s existence, Australia had limited flexibility in regards to foreign relations 
without first consulting with London.  As Evans and Grant suggest, the period from 1901 
to 1939 is thus characterized not by the evolution of a foreign policy per se, but by a 
belief that Australian diplomacy necessarily had to be conducted, if not on behalf of, at 
least in conjunction with British officials.37 
During the Second World War, due to Japan’s aggression and Britain’s 
abandonment, Australia’s thinking regarding both security and foreign policy began to 
change.  During this period, Canberra increasingly looked toward the United States, 
rather than Britain, to provide a security umbrella.  The dominant role played by the 
United States in the Pacific War was the decisive factor that determined the fate of 
Australia’s foreign policy at the end of the WWII.  It was determined then by a growing 
consensus that it was the United States, and not the United Kingdom, that would best 
guarantee Australia’s forward defense in Asia.38  Australia, by the end of the war, had 
found a new guarantor of its security; its capability to maneuver freely, however, had not 
yet developed.  As Evans and Grant point out, Australia had merely turned from one 
protector to another and in many ways continued to see its own policies as intimately tied 
to the global objective of major external powers.39 
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Australia’s postwar foreign policy was framed by the American doctrine of 
containment, a result of the “loss of China,” the French defeat in Indochina in 1954 and 
the Korean War, in which Australia contributed troops.  Australian Prime Minister 
Menzies, defined a related concept to containment, and referred to it as “forward 
defense.”  Ostensibly, Australia indicated a willingness to be the Western Bloc’s primary 
southern “anchor” by engaging in joint actions with the United States and its major allies. 
The ultimate expression of this geopolitical outlook, however, was the 
commitment to send combat troops to Vietnam in April 1965 to curtail 
what Prime Minister Menzies described as ‘China’s drive south between 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans.’40  
Although Vietnam was beyond Australia’s national interests, it paralleled the 
decision to send troops to Europe in both World Wars.  To illustrate the logic behind the 
decision to support the United States, when countries like Canada did not, the Australian 
embassy gave the following justification for involvement in Vietnam: 
Our objective should be to achieve such a habitual closeness of relations 
with the U.S. and sense of mutual alliance that in our time of need, after 
we have shown all reasonable restraint and good sense, the U.S. would 
have little option but to respond as we would want.41 
Quasi-abandonment of Australia by the United States after enunciating the Guam 
Doctrine by Richard Nixon in 1969 painstakingly revealed the need for Australia and 
other Southeast Asian American allies of their needs to provide more for their own 
defense.  The Guam Doctrine was first announced in July 1969 and then passed by the 
United States Congress in February 1970.  It stated whereas the United States was 
prepared to extend its nuclear umbrella to allies in the Asia-Pacific, henceforth the 
expectation would be for those allies to assume primary responsibility for their own 
defense.  This, coupled with a rising integration of Australia into Southeast Asian 
political and economic affairs, created a catalyst for Australia to renew its foreign policy 
design. 
                                                 
40 Chalk, 7. 
41 Minster-Counsellor Alan Renouf, quoted in Frank Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, (Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1987) 16. 
17 
With the election of Australia’s first Labor government in twenty-three years in 
1972, the new government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, immediately asserted 
that Australia had its own unique interests which should be evaluated and determined in 
light of the country’s specific circumstances and not as part of the United State’s global 
objective.42 
Under the Labor government, Australia revised its foreign policy, and it 
subsequently downplayed the centrality of the American (forward defense) alliance 
system, and placed greater emphasis on regional engagement and self-reliance (which 
realistically didn’t materialize until the late 1980s or early 1990s).  This period of foreign 
policy revision was short lived, as the Whitlam government was upended by the election 
of Malcolm Fraser (1975-1983) who promptly returned to the previous pattern of a pro-
American foreign policy.  Although Fraser did not specifically reverse the foreign policy 
initiatives of the preceding administration, he consciously reaffirmed the Australian-
American Alliance as a simple, cheap, and effective way of securing the country’s 
interests in Asia.43 
Under the administration of Prime Minister Bob Hawke, who governed from 1983 
until 1991, Australia continued to embrace a vigorous alliance with the United States.  
Throughout the 1980s, Australia steadfastly supported the West’s Cold War in opposition 
to the U.S.S.R.  However, in the late 1980s, Australia began to chart a more independent 
foreign policy by attempting to establish more integrated and substantive economic links 
to the north.  First by initiating the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process 
in 1989, and secondly, Prime Minister Hawke sought to situate Australia as an active 
participant in regional middle power diplomacy.44 
This evolution towards self-reliance was enunciated in the 1987 Defence White 
Paper, which for the first time spelled out a coherent policy of security self-reliance to be 
manifiested through its initiatives to protect the “air-sea gap” to Australia’s north.  The 
strategic imperative inherent in this paradigmatic shift was extremely important in that it 
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allowed foreign ministers to think about the promotion of regional defense and stability 
in a more dynamic, flexible, and systematic manner than ever before.45 
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, Australia has witnessed two governments 
from opposing parties.  During this period, Australia’s geopolitical shift toward Asia 
gained momentum, especially under the reduced threat of the Soviets in the Pacific, 
which allowed Australia to independently assess the imperatives of its foreign policy 
without the heavy hand of the United States.  No longer seeing itself as threatened, and 
convinced that protection may cease to be provided by the United States, Australia began 
to aggressively pursue the autonomous foreign policy it had begun to pursue in the mid-
1970s.  Australia began to pursue a network of new regional ties, demonstrated by their 
proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), which was 
specifically advanced as a metaphor for Asian dialogue and mutual confidence 
building.46  In attempts to strengthen Australia’s integration, Prime Minister Paul Keating 
(1991-1996) traveled frequently throughout the region.   
Through a heavy program of overseas visits and by cultivating close 
personal partnerships with regional leaders, the prime minister set about 
articulating the notion of politically and economically integrated region of 
which Australia was unequivocally a part47 
The conceptual foundation upon which the Keating government built these 
regional relationships was comprehensive engagement.  The framework provided by 
comprehensive engagement, which originated in the late 1980s, was a policy to shift 
Canberra’s policies away from dependency on the United States to an orientation that 
emphasized Australia’s Asia-Pacific geographic reality.  The goal was to foster a 
Southeast Asian community of peace and security, of which Australia was geographically 
if not culturally a part of.  Under the Keating government, Australia vigorously 
endeavored to play a constructive role in Southeast Asian multilateral diplomacy.  This 
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was played out through both Track I and Track II initiatives.  In summing up these 
efforts, Nancy Viviani offered these remarks: 
In the [1980s and] 1990s the Hawke Government embarked on an explicit 
strategy to enmesh Australia with Asia across [a wide] range of relations, 
to initiate a new regional security strategy…By the end of 1995 the 
Keating Government could, and did claim success on …these 
accounts…These were very substantial achievements given the history of 
the…long entrenched fears of Asia, and the cultural and family ties to[the 
West]48 
In 1996, John Howard and his Liberal-Nationalist coalition formed a new 
government in Canberra.  Since that time, and for a variety of external reasons, there has 
been a gradual re-adoption of a strong relationship with the United States.  This, in reality 
was a rejection of the notion of a self-reliant self-defense as the rise of China and the 
instability of Southeast Asia were made readily apparent after 1997.  While this revision 
does not imply a rejection and under emphasis of Southeast Asia, it merely reflected the 
realities that confronted the region in the post-Cold War as the early 1990s honeymoon 
ended.  Australia continued to play a constructive role in both Track I and Track II 
multilateral diplomacy.  Additionally, Canberra’s response to the East Asian financial 
crisis demonstrated Australia’s understanding of its importance to Southeast Asia, both 
unilaterally and in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, by providing loans 
to the wrecked economies. 
While some critics of John Howard’s government existed early during his tenure, 
a new round began both from within Australia and from Southeast Asian countries after 
the pronouncement of the “Howard Doctrine” in 1999.  In Australia’s magazine the 
Bulletin, John Howard unveiled a doctrine in which he proclaimed Australia should take 
a new place in Asia.  He was quoted as stating, “[Australia] has a particular responsibility 
to do things above and beyond in this part of the world” and was prepared to take on the 
role of America’s “deputy” in the region.49  The new strategy implied that the United 
States was the “globo-cop” or world’s sheriff.  The strategy included two core elements.  
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First, Australia would assume a more active role in Asian security matters, including 
further interventions as needed.  Second, Australia would undertake this role as “deputy” 
to the United States.50  By implication, and to allow for this foreign policy shift, Howard 
promised to increase Australian Defense spending to enable and expand the Australian 
Defence Force capabilities.  This so-called doctrine, at least openly, did not last long, as 
the Thai and Malaysian governments immediately condemned the moved. 
Barely a week passed before John Howard “was hastily denying parentage of the 
so-called Howard doctrine.”51  This was in response to the angry reactions from 
politicians and academics in countries such as Malaysia who said the remark “smacks of 
arrogance.”52  The critics suggested Australia does not have the moral right to appoint 
itself the deputy of the United States to maintain security in Asia.  In response, Prime 
Minister Howard rescinded his remarks in parliament stating “The government does not 
see Australia as playing the role of deputy for the United States, or indeed any other 
country in the region.”53  He went even further by remarking on America’s role as the 
world’s policeman by stating “And neither does the government see the United States 
itself…as a regional policeman.”54  Nevertheless, this issuance and subsequent 
withdrawal of this policy highlighted the Howard government’s re-adherence to a 
continued salience of the U.S.-Australia alliance.  However, overall engagement with 
Asia, and more specifically with Southeast Asia, continues to form a basic objective of 
Australian foreign policy.  The key country to this relationship is Indonesia, not the least 
because of its size, but also its geographic proximity, strategic influence, a preeminent 
position within ASEAN.  Thus, it is essential that one understand Australian-Indonesian 
relations to completely understand the East Timor crisis. 
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C. AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR 
To successfully determine the causes prompting Australia to take its leadership 
role in INTERFET, the following section will address the operation within the context of 
Australian-Indonesian relations.  Fully understanding this relationship will provide 
insight into Australia’s potential role in future interventions in Southeast Asia, 
particularly in Indonesia, a country often depicted on the verge of collapse.  Nicholas J. 
Wheeler and Tim Dunne address this subject by posing an important question in regards 
to Australian regional foreign relations.  They asked whether the decision to mobilize 
support for an intervention force in East Timor represented a voluntary “U-turn” or 
should it be thought of as a change of direction forced upon the Australian government 
by events.55  Simply stated, did Australia’s intervention into East Timor represent a 
complete shift from a “Jakarta First” policy?  If it was, what were the causes?  If not, was 
INTERFET an isolated incident that will not be replicated in the future?  The intent of 
this section is to demonstrate that INTERFET represented a shift, not a U-turn and that 
the conditions that required intervention into East Timor will not be recurrent.  Thus, the 
Australia’s leadership role in future INTERFET-type operations will not easily be 
replicated in the future without significant political restraints and constraints. 
“Until 1998 there had been a consensus in Australia foreign policy that good 
relations with Indonesia were more important than the self-determination of the 
Timorese.”56  This policy has been consistently been framed within the confines of 
Australian national security and economic interests.  To further understand the factors 
that cause this Jakarta First Policy requires a brief historical evaluation of Australian-
Indonesian relations.   
Peter Chalk divides Australia’s foreign relations with Indonesia into three periods, 
1) the early years; 1945-1965, 2) the new order; 1965-1988; and 3) 1988 to the Present.57  
The period between 1945 and 1949 were cordial as Australia supported the Indonesian 
struggle for independence.  The years between 1950 and 1965 were somewhat strained 
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and dominated both by attitudes and predilections of the Sukarno government and the 
perceived imperatives of Cold War ideological politics.  Relations began to improve with 
the emergence of Suharto’s “New Order” government and the election of Australian 
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, which saw Indonesia realign with the West and adopt a 
“regional good neighbor” policy and Australia began its initial emphasis on an Asia-
Pacific policy.  
Throughout the 1970s, Australian and Indonesian relations strengthened, and it 
was under this political environment that the East Timor issue erupted in 1975.  In the 
weeks proceeding Jakarta’s invasion of the territory, both Australia’s prime minster and 
the United States administration under President Ford secretly intimated that neither 
Australia, nor the United States would actively oppose an Indonesian takeover of the 
former Portuguese colony.58  Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, 80s and most of the 
90s, Canberra did not oppose the annexation, a position contrary to the UN.  The cause 
for Australia’s not only de facto but eventual de jure recognition in 1979 of Indonesia’s 
annexation of East Timor was justified by both Australian strategic and economic 
interests. 
From a strategic point of view, Indonesia has a population that is ten times larger 
than its southern neighbor, causing concern for Australians of the potential threat several 
hundred miles north of its sparsely populated northern coast.  “Rather than engaging in a 
costly Cold War with its northern neighbor, policy-makers preferred promoting a ‘stable 
pro-Western government in Jakarta and maintaining friendly relations with it.”59  While 
security may be the primary justification for the “Jakarta First” policy, economic reasons 
were not far behind.  Indonesia provides a large market, low-cost labor source for 
Australian industry, and abundant natural resources.  As the security threat from 
Indonesia waned, the economic prerogatives began to replace the cause for Australia’s 
continued muted stance on East Timor despite domestic animosity to the Indonesian 
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invasion.  The privileged status of oil resources, particularly in the context of the oil crisis 
of the 1970s, played a significant role, particularly in respect to developing and 
exploiting the resources in the Timor Gap.60  To seal Australia’s policy towards East 
Timor, Jakarta specifically linked the initiation of negotiations of the Timor Gap to gain 
Australia’s formal recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty over their annexed claim.  
Wheeler and Dunne propose a third reason for Australia’s policy towards East 
Timor, besides security and economic reasons.  They argue that the “Jakarta First” 
concerns include a regional dimension.  These reasons include supporting Indonesia’s 
attempt to maintain the archipelago together in confrontation with other secessionists’ 
movements and to accommodate ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in internal 
affairs as Australia expanded its regional economic outreach.  In culmination, these 
reasons—security, economic and regional interests—caused Australian “appeasement” to 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor until 1999. 
As the relationship between Indonesia and Australia developed, it was ostensibly 
confirmed by new economic and security agreements.  In 1989, Australia signed the 
Timor Gap treaty, permitting joint exploitation of oil and gas reserves.  In 1995, Keating 
and Suharto signed an Agreement to Maintain Security (AMS).  This was the first 
bilateral security agreement entered into by Indonesia.61  Although not a full-fledged 
alliance in the sense of imposing formal defense commitments, the AMS nevertheless 
represented an extremely significant development.  “Not only did the accord lend further 
credibility to Australia’s desire to constructively engage with its Southeastern Asian 
neighbors, it was also highly important in a symbolic sense.”62  However, domestic 
situations would develop in the latter half of the 1990s—the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
and Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998—to create an opportunity for both Australia’s 
“accommodationalist” policy and Indonesia’s policy towards East Timor to be 
significantly changed. 
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By the end of 1998, it became apparent that a shift in Australia’s and Indonesia’s 
policy and thinking was about to occur.  Due to both external and internal political 
relations, the leader of Indonesia’s interim government, President Habibie, announced 
that he was prepared to offer “special status” for East Timor, while stating that this would 
be conditional on Indonesia’s continued sovereignty over East Timor.  “Whatever the 
balance between endogenous and exogenous factors in creating a new context for the 
Timor question, the effect was to disturb the settled assumptions that had previously 
shaped Indonesian-Australian bilateral relations.”63  According to a book published by 
the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in 2001 on the 
Government’s policy shift, under John Howard, during the 1998-2000 period two key 
considerations provided the catalyst.  First, there was a concern that, despite Habibie’s 
announcement in June 1998, there had been no progress in the tripartite talks between 
Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN.  The situation on the ground was increasingly volatile 
and “Australia was concerned that if growing defiance towards Indonesian rule was met 
by renewed TNI [Indonesian Military] repression, the situation in East Timor could 
deteriorate beyond control.”  Second, there was growing support in Australia, after 
Suharto’s fall, for self-determination of the Timorese.64  Peter Chalk expands on this 
policy departure and includes the following factors that explain, Australia’s and 
particularly John Howard’s shift in policy between late 1998 and February 2000. 
• First, assessments carried out by the DFAT began to suggest that 
Indonesia could simultaneously handle its own traumatic transition 
towards democracy while dealing with the loss of East Timor. 
• Second, a comprehensive review, which sought the opinions of Timorese 
political leaders and refuges on the questions of autonomy versus 
independence, determined that even a nominal connection to Jakarta 
would probably be unacceptable to the majority of the territory’s 
population. 
• Third, personal interjections by the foreign minister, Alexander Downer, 
fed into an increasingly active diplomatic line vis-à-vis Indonesia.  Of 
particular importance was his insistence that, just as in Cambodia, 
Australia was faced with an historic opportunity to craft a resolution to a 
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long-standing conflict, which had generated considerable political debate 
and interest in Australia. 
• Finally, Habibie’s totally unexpected declaration in January 1999 that a 
rejection of his offer of autonomy would result in separation and 
independence changed the entire geopolitical context of the East Timor 
conflict.  This announcement not only provided an opening for more 
activist agenda that Downer was beginning to push at the time, it also 
essentially presented the Australian government with a fait accompli that 
simply could not be ignored.  In this sense, it has been suggested Canberra 
was simply reacting to events in Jakarta itself rather than striking out on a 
fundamentally different and radical East Timor policy of its own 
making.65  
In December, Prime Minister John Howard personally wrote to Indonesia’s 
interim president Habibie urging gradual Indonesian disengagement from East Timor.  
On 12 January, the Australian Government proclaimed, in conjunction to revealing 
Howard’s December letter, support for autonomy and eventual vote on the self-
determination in East Timor, “abrogating the implicit proscription entailed by AMS.”66  
This may have annoyed Habibie, yet on 27 January 1999 he proposed that if the East 
Timorese rejected a proposal for autonomy within Indonesia, he would ask the People’s 
Consultative Assembly to grant them independence.  On 5 May, an agreement was signed 
by the UN, Portugal, and Indonesia to allow an UN-supervised ballot.  “A key and 
controversial element in the agreement was that the TNI had sole responsibility for law 
and order.  The consequences of this decision were disastrous.”67   
As the violence in East Timor spread, either with the support of the Indonesian 
military or their simple disregard for the unraveling situation—TNI proved incapable of 
restraining the violence.  As this occurred Australia became an early advocate of UN 
intervention.  Naively, the international community proceeded with the referendum for 
independence.  As the results of the vote became clear, in which the 78.5% of the 
Timorese voted for independence, and the murderous rampage of Indonesian backed pro-
integrationist militias made immediate external intervention paramount.   
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In this context, with no coherent regional security structure in place to 
offer credible alternative authority, and the United States holding back 
from taking the initiative, the UN Security Council approved the 
formation of INTERFET under Australian leadership.68 
On 4 September, Kofi Annan announced the results of the ballot.  After an 
election that was relatively void of conflict and intimidation from the pro-Indonesia 
militias, the results of the ballot resulted in rampaging militiamen killing key figures of 
the independence movement and terrorizing pro-secession civilians.  Witnesses to the 
violence estimated that in just days over 1000 Timorese had been killed.69  According to 
Jeffrey Bartholet of Newsweek, “Dili was an apocalyptic landscape.”70  Although 
President Habibie ordered the TNI to restore order and gave assurances that both 
Indonesian military and police units could comply, it quickly became apparent that he 
was not in a position to either direct or ensure compliance with such an order.  
Consequently, it became clear that to end the violence in East Timor a peacekeeping 
force would need to be deployed to the battered island. 
While the UN Security Council and the Secretary General began diplomatic 
attempts to subdue the violence, Australian news sources splashed the violent images 
across the country, thus galvanizing the public to demand action to end the atrocities.  “A 
major factor behind this public reaction was the sense of shame Australia’s continuing 
betrayal of the people of East Timor; support for an armed intervention to protect the East 
Timorese was a way of trying to absolve the country of its past guilt.”  Australian 
politicians were equally outraged and remorseful of Australia’s past “blind eye” towards 
the Timorese, and equally frustrated by the inability to prevent the escalation of violence.  
Despite a twenty-four year policy of Jakarta First, Howard announced, in conjunction 
with enunciation of the Howard Doctrine, on 5 September that Australia was prepared to 
lead a multinational force into East Timor.  However, “he was explicit that military 
intervention without Indonesian approval was not an option.”71  Evident obviously was 
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the constraint and importance of sovereignty, which helps forecast the willingness of 
Australia to act in such a manner in the future. 
After various forms of international coercion, most notably the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) threat to cancel the post-financial crisis bailout funds, Habibie 
accepted international peacekeepers.  Consequently, the Indonesian government 
‘consented’ to the deployment, but there were attempts by TNI and the Indonesian 
parliament to veto any Australian participation in any UN force.72  This position 
paralleled ASEAN states’ views, but it was apparent it was Australia not a member of the 
regional organization that had both the political will and the military capability to deploy 
to East Timor.  Other options, included a strictly UN peacekeeping force led by and 
comprised of Asian states.  While an alternative, it would have taken months to assemble 
and deploy.  Further, deploying a strictly UN force may have restricted the capability to 
quell the violence that had plagued the situation and may have actually caused an 
escalation.   
On 14 September, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer formally wrote 
to the UN Secretary-General with the offer to lead a multinational force.  The formal 
endorsement of this offer by the Security Council, in conjunction with the President 
Habibie’s acceptance of international assistance, made possible the unanimous adoption 
of Resolution 1264 on 15 September that authorized INTERFET.  The vanguard of the 
international peacekeeping force arrived in East Timor on 20 September.  Although 
Indonesia had consented to the deployment, Habibie’s previous inability to restrain TNI 
would suggest the possibility of an unfriendly welcome.  Canberra could not be 
“absolutely clear,” argues James Cotton, “that the Indonesian military would comply with 
the will of the UN and cooperate with the international force.”73  Although the 
Australians were not confronted with significant opposition, they were prepared for the 
possibility.74  
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According to Wheeler and Dunne, Australia’s leadership role in INTERFET 
marks an important departure for both Australia’s “Jakarta First” policy and previous 
Western interventions.  “The case of INTERFET is particularly significant in this respect 
because Australia’s vital interests were clearly not being served by its armed rescue of the 
East Timorese.”75  From 1975 to 1999, there was consistent Australian bi-partisan 
support for a “Jakarta First” policy.  However, what is yet to be determined was whether 
it was the Howard Doctrine or the humanitarian catastrophe that persuaded the Australian 
government to act.  Clearly there was domestic outrage of the atrocities occurring a mere 
300 miles north of Darwin, but what wasn’t tested was Australia’s continued 
commitment if the situation endured and resulted in a lengthy deployment of troops, 
causalities of even a limited number, or significantly deteriorated Australian-Southeast 
Asian relations.  Further, as James Cotton points out, “If the territory concerned had not 
been East Timor, Australia would not had assumed the leadership role.”76 
If the Howard Doctrine was the root cause for Australia taking the lead, which 
implies Australia was playing the part of a U.S. deputy, a dilemma results when 
Australian and American interests diverge.  Further, as indicated by the outrage at the 
announcement of the doctrine amongst Southeast Asian nations.  “Anti-Australian 
sentiment and violence has emerged throughout Indonesia, and relations with Australia’s 
other northern neighbors have suffered due to the correct perception that Australia has 
backed away form its commitment to integrate with Asia as enunciated by the Keating 
Labor government.”77  Even if Australian and U.S. interest converge on the requirements 
to replicate an East Timor-like situation and Australia deems it necessary to intervene in a 
future scenario, some glaring military limitations were evident in Australia’s participation 
in INTERFET.  As demonstrated in the following section INTERFET, relative to other 
UN PKOs, was limited in size, and the Australian Defense Force (ADF) was pushed to 
the envelop of its operating capacity.  
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D. MILITARY LIMITATIONS 
James Cotton demonstrated that the ADF equipment and systems performed 
surprisingly well considering the urgency of the INTERFET operation.  However, he 
later cautions that the “the logistics systems were fully stretched to deliver this result.  If 
elements of the Indonesian military had opposed it, even surreptitiously, the operation 
would have run into severe difficulties.”78  Even INTERFET commander Major General 
Peter Cosgrove candidly pointed out “the Australian logistics contingent supported the 
whole [INTERFET] force—well above design capacity.”79  In reality, it was almost a 
miracle that the Australian logistics system successfully supported the entire INTERFET 
operation.  Comments by United States Marines who participated in INTERFET 
supported this argument and frankly stated that the ADF was “tapped out” and essentially 
the 11th and 13th Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) provided almost in entirety the 
movement of supplies by helicopters provided by the MEU’s Aviation Combat 
Element.80  
While the Australians would have been sufficiently able to support and sustain the 
ADF, what became apparent was that the coalition leader had to be prepared to provide 
whatever support was necessary for the entire force and its components.  This included 
not only food and shelter but also, on occasion, munitions, communications facilities, and 
transport.  This is standard in other coalition operations, particularly those led by the 
United States.  However, Australia was confronted with supporting countries that 
routinely do not work together and are not modern, well-equipped militaries like 
members of NATO.  
Arguably, the 5,000 Australian soldiers deployed to East Timor did a 
commendable job, but, as demonstrated, stretched the Australia to the limit.  However as 
the Economist points out, “If conflict had called for a simultaneous intervention, 
Australia would probably not have been able to respond.”81  Can Australia really be 
                                                 
78 Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” 137. 
79 Ian Bostock, “By the Book.  East Timor: An Operational Evaluation,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 
May 2000, 27. 
80 Author interview with Major Chad Sbragia, USMC, Battalion Landing Team 1/1 Operations Officer 
on December 15, 2001. 
81 “To Arms,” The Economist, February 3, 2001. 
30 
depended upon to be Southeast Asia’s “Brushfire Brigade?”82  The ADF, certainly not in 
size but in capability, is one of the most potent military forces in Asia-Pacific.  It has a 
modern Air Force, Navy and Army, but it is significantly restricted to within several 
hundred nautical miles of Australia.  Without any aircraft carriers and limited numbers of 
air-to-air refuelers, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is unlikely to provide air 
cover for an amphibious task force or ground forces deployed offshore.  While the Royal 
Australian Navy (RAN) is also very capable, there are a limited amount of troop carrying 
ships, and those are incapable of operating more than a handful of assault and logistic 
support helicopters.  Furthermore, the RAN is unable to provide Naval Gunfire Support, 
which would be a requirement if the RAAF cannot provide close air support (CAS).83   
The Australian government has recognized these deficiencies and has begun to 
appropriate funding to meet these shortfalls.  However, much of this equipment is still 
several years away.84  Ultimately this raises questions about the military capability of the 
ADF to lead future multinational peacekeeping operations, even if the political will to do 
so is present.  While INTERFET demanded approximately 5,000 ADF troops, other 
PKOs throughout the world have often exceeded 20,000 troops—clearly out of the 
capability of the ADF.  Another point that needs to be articulated was the U.S. support 
for INTERFET.  While the United States clearly was supporting the ADF, the choice of 
American forces questions the validity of their claim to be only supporting logistically.  
While it is true that the United States did not put Marines into East Timor, the support 
was clearly not just logistics support.85  The Marines provided combat support of 
Australian and other INTERFET forces ashore, not logistical support.  Considering that 
the Marine CH-53E helicopters supporting the ADF were armed with door mounted .50 
caliber machine guns, and that the Marines had a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and 
Personnel (TRAP) force staged in the event that an aircraft went down either through 
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hostile fire or malfunction, it clearly is a falsification to deem the United States in support 
of INTERFET as merely providing logistics support.86  Furthermore, while not on the 
ground, there were still 2,200 Marines deployed on Amphibious ships and in a position, 
while not tasked specifically, to provide a reserve or quick reaction force for the 
Australians.  The equipment associated with these Marines included attack helicopters 
(AH-1Ws), attack jets (AV-8Bs), potent M1A1 Tanks and other mechanized and capable 
platforms to provide the needed fire support if required.  Thus, it is unrealistic to simply 
state that the United States merely provided logistics support to the ADF, and certainly 
calls into question the accuracy of portraying the East Timor Model as a feasible model 
for future operations. 
E. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE 
While Australia may have demonstrated the leadership to lead peacekeeping 
operations, thus allowing the United States to limit its commitment worldwide, it should 
be apparent there is no guarantee that Australia is willing politically and capable military 
to provide such a role in the near future.   
Australia’s interest in East Timor was an anomaly, and no other nation in 
the region looks like a viable candidate for leading future humanitarian 
interventions in the territories of failing states.  There is little evidence that 
the East Timor experience has influenced the regional security 
perspective.87  
Furthermore, in opposition to Australia role as the U.S. deputy, Charles Hill 
argues against this in an essay written for the Hoover Digest.   
When one regional power, in this case Australia, intervenes in another 
regional power’s problem, we are headed back toward a dangerous world 
in which nations compete for spheres of influence.  The very concept of 
international security is undermined when conflicts are left to neighbors to 
solve and when the United States hesitates to venture out of its own 
NATO-area sphere of influence.88   
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While the military capability may exist in the future, Australia will clearly be 
restrained politically, both from regional neighbors and domestically, to routinely act as 




























ASEAN was formally established at Bangkok on 8 August 1967.  It brought 
together five countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines—
in one of the most divergent group of states to form a regional organization.  As an 
institution that promotes regional cooperation, ASEAN has prevented conflict amongst 
its member states since its origin.  Paradoxically, the largest threat to a majority of the 
ASEAN member states has been domestic in nature, but the organization has had no 
success preventing or resolving civil war and internal state conflict within its 
membership.  The primary explanation for this has been the organization’s adherence to 
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.  Consequently, 
the intent of this chapter is to historically review the origins of ASEAN.  After 
completing this, the chapter will assess the potential for change in the near future and 
evaluate the prospect that ASEAN as a collective regional organization or an individual 
ASEAN member would lead an intervention in a member state’s internal affairs, 
particularly in regards to a humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping operation, and 
satisfy the third characteristic of the ETM. 
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
Soon after the conclusion of World War II, there were several attempts to involve 
Asian countries in regional cooperation, but all involved and were initiated by external 
powers.  “The conflictual nature of major-power relations and the interpretation of 
security dynamics at the various levels prevented the development of regional 
cooperation among Asian countries.”89  The first indigenous efforts toward Asian 
regional cooperation took place in the maritime Southeast Asia.  Malaya (now Malaysia), 
the Philippines, and Thailand formed the Association for Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961.  
However, the Philippine claim to Sabah and the Indonesian confrontation halted the 
development of ASA from 1963 until 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian 
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Nations (ASEAN) succeeded it.  ASEAN represented a collection of states that were not 
only dissimilar in terms of physical size, ethnic composition, socio-cultural heritage and 
identity, colonial experience and postcolonial polities, they had limited cause or 
experience to ensure success.  According to the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok 
Declaration) of 8 August 1967, it is clear that the organization emphasized economic, 
social, and cultural cooperation, rather than political cooperation.  While this is the 
formally articulated purpose, it is clear that security was a key concern from its inception.   
Muthia Alagappa defines several reasons which lay behind the formation of 
ASEAN: fear of internal and international communism, reduced faith in or mistrust of 
external powers; Indonesia’s decision to pursue its “active and independent” foreign 
policy through regional cooperation; the desire on the part of Malaysia and Singapore to 
constrain Indonesia and bring it into a more cooperative framework; considerations of 
regime consolidation in nearly all member states; and the desire to concentrate on 
economic development.90  Nevertheless, these alone do not provide the required 
ingredients for a successful regional organization amongst countries without significant 
cultural and political homogeneity.  According to Amitav Acharya, without a common 
ethnic or cultural bond, the basis for a regionalism had to be constructed through 
interaction.  “Such interactions could only be purposeful if they were consistent and rule 
based, employing those rules which would ensure peaceful conduct among the member 
states.  To this end, ASEAN’s founders over a period of a decade from its inception 
adopted and specified a set of norms for intra-regional relations.”91 
While not formally developed, ASEAN discovered its informal political/security 
roles in its early years through the containing of the Malaysian/Philippine dispute over 
Sabah and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration.92  These roles and subsequent evolving norms 
hail from organizations, both global and regional, and from the Southeast Asian social, 
cultural, and political milieu.  Evidence of both these sources is apparent in a variety of 
documents that have been issued by ASEAN.  Often cited as the “ASEAN way,” defining 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 107. 
91 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 47. 
92 Harada and Tanaka, 328.  
36 
these ideals requires a closer look at the treaties that established the principles upon 
which ASEAN is grounded.  The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed in Bali in 1976 
outlined the following principles: 
• Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of 
all nations. 
• The right for every state to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion, and coercion. 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another.  
• Settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means. 
• Renunciation of the threat of use of force.93   
The following section will analyze the evolution of the most controversial and 
written about principles, the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, 
particularly as it applies to the content of this thesis.  “Arguably the single most important 
principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism is the doctrine of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member-states.”94  Understanding the source and cause for this 
principle will allow one to further understand the potential for ASEAN or a member-state 
to participate or lead a UN sanctioned peacekeeping operation and under what terms they 
may agree to.   
Non-intervention is a by-product of the Westphalian state-system.  Defined as the 
duty of states not to interfere with the internal actions of a sovereign state, “it is the 
principal practical expression of the right of sovereignty in the context of inter-state 
relations.”95  By international law, sovereignty and non-intervention are key elements of 
the UN system and are guaranteed by the UN charter.  Thus, the acceptance of these 
international norms is not unique for ASEAN.  Nevertheless, the historical context in 
which a majority of the member states of the regional organization became nation-states 
has given non-intervention a special significance.  Why ASEAN states as a group of 
newly independent (with the exception of Thailand, which was never a colony) 
interference the central tenet of intra-regional relations developing states made non-                                                 
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should not require significant explanation.  The ASEAN members all were seeking, and 
continue to seek both internal stability and regime security.  As “new” countries with 
“weak” state structures and, a lack of regime legitimacy, “the primary threat to national 
security of the ASEAN states were not external, but internal.  The threat from within 
outweighed the threat from without.”96  Thus, the principle of non-intervention was a 
cornerstone of ASEAN member-state security, from both the potential of superpower and 
other member-state involvement in their internal affairs.  In the context of the Cold War, 
ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference was a collective commitment to the survival of its 
non-communist regimes against the threat of communist subversion.   
Consequently, the principle for non-interference was concerned with two parallel, 
yet separate goals with separate consequences.  The principle was associated with both a 
concern over great power involvement in the region and directed at regulating relations 
between member-states of ASEAN.  As the norms of the organization were universally 
accepted amongst its members, “certain patterns regarding the implementation of non-
intervention emerged in the practice of ASEAN diplomacy.”97  According to Acharya, 
the implementation on non-intervention in ASEAN had four main dictates: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of the governments of member-
states towards its own people. 
• Directing criticism at the actions of states that are perceived to constitute a 
breach of the principle of non-intervention. 
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel 
group seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighboring 
state. 
• Providing political support and material assistance to member-states in 
their actions against subversive activities.98 
While adherence to these dictates has been instrumental to the maintenance of 
peaceful relations between members of ASEAN, it has not provided a means to 
collectively resolve domestic conflicts which have the potential to threaten the 
increasingly economically interdependent region.  The 1997 Asian financial crisis 
revealed the internal fragility of many Southeast Asian states and the relative failure of 
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three-decades of nation-building efforts.  The rising occurrence of low-intensity civil 
wars in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand provided evidence of this 
failure.  The financial meltdown, however, and its aftermath cruelly exposed ASEAN’s 
limitations.  In practice, the organization had merely succeeded in using economic growth 
to ameliorate, rather than solve, problems among its members.  Arguably, those states 
that have been victimized by internal conflicts could have been taken advantage of by 
their neighbors, but the wholesale acceptance of the non-interference norm has prevailed.  
Further, not only has the norm been successful at preventing inter-state conflict, it has 
been utilized as a means of the elites of the region’s authoritarian regimes to commit 
human rights violations without any protest.  “This was clearly manifested in the silence 
of the members of ASEAN on the case of East Timor following its annexation by 
Indonesia.”99   
1. The Limits of Cooperative Security100 
Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia was never intended to supplant the bi-
lateral alliance arrangements of the region’s members but to merely supplement them.  
Consequently, this has historically prevented both the development of neither a collective 
security nor collective self-defense regime within the region.  Instead, regional 
cooperation has been directed towards building trust and confidence amongst the 
members, developing norms and principles to prevent the escalation of inter-state 
disputes into limited or full-scale conflict.  The role of cooperative security is primarily to 
prevent the region’s internal conflict by non-military means.101  Conflict containment and 
termination are generally handled outside of the cooperative security arrangement.  The 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is ASEAN’s mechanism for promoting cooperative 
security amongst the ASEAN and other countries that maintain membership in the 
organization.  The ARF contributes to conflict prevention by facilitating communications, 
providing information, increasing transparency, and reducing uncertainty.  “Even in that 
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realm, its immediate goal is not to institute far-reaching security regimes but to help 
create a normative context that can lead to the emergence of such regimes in the 
future.”102   
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the first comprehensive high-level 
consultative forum on political and security issues in the Asian-Pacific region.  Its first 
annual working session was held in 1994.  Participants were Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, Viet Nam, and the European Union.  
Now the membership has increased in number to twenty-one, with the participation of 
Cambodia (1995), India, and Myanmar (1996). 
Because the ARF is a cooperative security organization, its major feature is 
institutionalizing dialogue, not security mechanisms.  ARF has been modestly successful 
in promoting dialogue and has adopted numerous confidence—and security—building 
measures, particularly with respect to transparency measures, and developed mechanisms 
to facilitate joint-exercises and training programs.  The Second ARF meeting took place 
in Bandar Seri Begawan in Brunei Darussalam on 1 August 1995.  This meeting endorsed 
the Report of the Chairman103 and adopted “a gradual evolutionary approach” to security 
cooperation.  The evolution was to take place in three stages:   
Stage I  Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures 
Stage II  Development of Preventative Diplomacy Mechanisms 
Stage III  Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms 
Stage I was meant to begin immediately in 1996 with Stage II, preventative 
diplomacy, being a natural follow-up.  However, Stage III, which provides mechanisms 
for the initiation of a regional peacekeeping force etc. will not be established until a later 
undetermined date.  This is enunciated in the ARF Concept Paper, stating: 
It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms conflict 
resolution in the immediate future.  The establishment of such 
mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue as 
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they proceed to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional 
peace and stability104   
This is certainly still true today and demonstrated a significant limitation for the ARF in 
the East Timor situation.  
In addition to the ARF not yet pursuing mechanisms for conflict resolution, the 
forum is further limited in doing this by its inheritance of ASEAN principles.  As recently 
as the 8th Forum in July 2001, the ARF “emphasized the importance of ARF making 
decision by consensus and on the basis of non-interference into one another's internal 
affairs.”105  Certainly given both the continued adherence to this principle and the 
absence of any near term mechanism to resolve conflict, particularly civil war, the ARF 
appears as an unlikely near-term solution to these situations.  In a critical description of 
the ARF, Richard Haass stated the following: “The ARF in particular is a frequently 
frustrating exercise in ‘convoy diplomacy’—always moving at the speed of the slowest 
member.” 106  
As a cooperative security organization, the ARF and its originator ASEAN have 
proven adept and extremely successful at preventing conflict, however the overall intent 
of this chapter is to demonstrate that its inability to resolve conflict is grounded in its 
historic principles. 
C. EAST TIMOR 
Sonny Inbaraj’s East Timor: Blood and Tears in ASEAN is a critical retelling of 
the tragedy that occurred on Timor.  It exposes ASEAN as “an accomplice” to Suharto’s 
government’s invasion and subsequent handling of East Timor.  According to Inbaraj, 
ASEAN, in the name of the principle of non-interference in one another’s domestic 
affairs, refused to utter one word of protest or concern about the violence levied upon the 
East Timorese taking place in their backyard.  “ASEAN’s silence on East Timor, 
however, is no aberration.  It is consistent with ASEAN’s shoddy record on questions of 
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human rights and democracy.”107  Thus, this chapter uses ASEAN’s handling of East 
Timor, an incident that provides timely relevance to predicting a response from the 
organization in a future and analogous situation. 
ASEAN’s insistence upon non-interference in domestic affairs throughout the 
twenty-five year occupation of East Timor by Indonesia is well documented.  However, 
the Dili Massacre in 1991 took the East Timor issue from a relatively obscure situation to 
a major international news item overnight due to the presence of foreign witnesses.  A 
British television station’s broadcast of footage showing Indonesian security forces firing 
upon civilians in the Santa Cruz cemetery presented East Timor’s plight to the world.  “In 
the past, there have been regular reports of mass killings in East Timor, but none shocked 
the world so much as the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre, captured on film by the 
courageous British cameraman.”108  While a significant story amongst the Western press, 
official media reactions in ASEAN to the situation were muted. 
Sonny Inbaraj carefully and critically presented the ASEAN-wide limited 
coverage of East Timor in his book and other articles.  He points out, even Malaysia, 
which had a citizen murdered working as a NGO volunteer, failed to cover his funeral in 
any major newspaper, prompting speculation of a widespread censorship in the name of 
ASEAN solidarity.  Although having a record of accomplished foreign policy stands on 
the question of human rights abuses in South Africa and the Middle East, Malaysia failed, 
despite the Parliamentary opposition’s attempts, to raise the issue to its southern 
neighbor.109  A glaring example of the ASEAN standard of not interfering in the internal 
affairs of other countries occurred a year later.   
In September of 1992, a Malaysian TV producer allowed unedited footage of the 
Santa Cruz massacre to be broadcast, prompting an official Indonesian protest.  
Indonesian Members of Parliament claimed the airing of the documentary on Indonesian 
soldiers firing upon East Timorese protestors was equivalent to intervention in the 
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country’s domestic affairs.110  A visit to Jakarta by the Malaysian Minister of 
Information, after the TV producer had been fired, was to apologize for the breach of 
inter-ASEAN etiquette.  Unfortunately, for ASEAN’s reputation and the East Timorese, 
the situation that occurred in Dili would be a prelude to how the Southeast Asian states 
would react eight years later. 
Demonstrated throughout the East Timor situation was ASEAN’s inability to 
manage inter-communal violence, and the events that would occur in August and 
September of 1999 would prove no different.  The most recent crisis in East Timor was 
sparked by a vote for independence, occurring after international pressure upon the 
recently established post-Suharto government of Indonesia.  As written by Wade Huntley 
and Peter Hayes,  
The bloodshed and turmoil in East Timor have cast in stark relief the utter 
inadequacy of existing Asia-Pacific security arrangements to cope with 
regional crises, let alone enduring challenges, and highlight vital questions 
concerning the relationship of international security and human rights in 
the post-Cold War.111 
As the violence in East Timor developed in the late summer of 1999, it became 
quickly apparent that a forceful and timely intervention to stop the killing was urgent yet 
not forthcoming.  As the situation unfolded, some argued that the responsibility lay in the 
hands of the ASEAN member states, if not the organization itself, to intervene both 
diplomatically and with military forces if required.  Walden Bello called upon ASEAN to 
move immediately to form the core of a UN peacekeeping mission.  Bello asserted, “All 
commitments of armed peacekeepers to East Timor must be done under the mandate of 
the United Nations and ASEAN.”112   
INTERFET ultimately received a UN mandate.  Nevertheless, ASEAN was 
incapable, either collectively or as individual countries, of taking part in a meaningful 
leadership role.  As Richard Tanter argued at the onset of the crisis, the ARF “has made 
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no contribution to resolving the East Timor conflict in the past, and has little to offer 
now.”113  Tanter’s vision proved prophetic.  As the days passed the initiative to form a 
peacekeeping force fell by default to Australia and behind it, the United States, although 
both did so reluctantly.  Despite Indonesia’s expressed desire for more active 
involvement by ASEAN states, those states proved warily fractious and contentious.  
Malaysia, an active participant in UN peacekeeping operations abroad and proclaimed 
advocate of human rights,  
Reacted ambivalently as the crisis unfolded and ultimately bowed out of 
INTERFET’s first phase of the deployment in a pique after UN secretary 
general Kofi Annan offered Thailand the role of second-in-command 
behind Australia.114 
Even democratic Thailand’s involvement in INTERFET was domestically 
contentious.  An internal debate developed that pitted their activist Foreign Minister 
Surin Pitsuwan against more traditional military and defense elites, consequently sending 
mixed signals on Thailand’s real support.  The Philippines made a significant 
contribution of forces to INTERFET, but it also blurred its pro-human rights message by 
joining China in opposing the UN Human Rights Commission vote to conduct an 
international inquiry into the East Timor situation. 
“In sum, ASEAN member states, individually and collectively, reacted to the 
crisis with contradiction and paralysis.”115  Obviously, the long held ASEAN principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states was the catalyst for this 
inaction.  The prospective consequences and implications for the future of the ever more 
interdependent ASEAN are sweeping.  The requirement to deploy an international 
peacekeeping force, particularly when the United States and other regional powers 
hesitated to act, provided the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) an opportunity to establish 
a functioning role in resolving security dilemmas with the potential for trans-national 
escalation.  This failure to act essentially ceded the initiative to the United States, which 
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ultimately conflicted with another tantamount principle of ASEAN—that of opposing 
great power intervention in the region.   
In short, the opportunity for the ARF to function as the fulcrum for 
regional security coordination and dialogue was squandered, and it is 
unlikely that the ARF or related nascent regional institutions will play any 
major role in security deliberations or outcomes in the near future.  With 
no other meaningful autonomous security institutions on the horizon, the 
path is clear for big powers to continue to contend for hegemony in the 
region.116 
D. ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY? 
While the previous review of ASEAN/ARF’s handling of the most recent East 
Timor crisis may elucidate a dim future for the resolution of internal conflict, some 
positives did emerge from the situation.  First, the fact that both the Philippines and 
Thailand participated in INTERFET from its initiation demonstrates as least individually 
some flexibility in their interpretation of non-interference in domestic affairs.  Secondly, 
both Indonesia’s willingness to accept international forces to quell an internal situation 
and their request to ASEAN countries demonstrates a possible shift in the long held norm 
of interference from a country that was a cornerstone of the doctrine.  Even conservative 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir has suggested that cooperative peacekeeping could be 
expanded beyond the traditional separation of combatants to “keeping sea lanes open and 
air space free of piracy and hijackings…cross border fire fighting, and rescu[ing] the 
innocent hostages of hijackings and piracy.”117  These remarks interestingly were from a 
man who sacked his deputy prime minister for stating similar statements three years 
earlier.118  Before the crisis, other countries, notably Thailand and the Philippines, floated 
the idea of reducing the anachronistic policy of non-interference in response to the Asian 
Financial Crisis.   
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The first attempt to re-examine the non-intervention doctrine in relation to 
changes developing in the international order occurred when Anwar Ibrahim wrote an 
article for Newsweek International in July 1997 calling for a policy of “constructive 
intervention.”  At the time, this was considered an innovative proposal, even though 
Anwar argued that it did not violate the principle of non-intervention.119  Of the five 
proposals in the article, one struck a chord in opposition to the principle: the proposal that 
aid should be provided to strengthen civil society in other countries caused suspicions of 
intervention in internal affairs creating a rather lukewarm response amongst ASEAN 
members. 
In June 1998, activist Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan revived Anwar’s 
proposal at an address at Bangkok’s Tharmasat University.  The rapid spread of 
economic crisis, caused by the ever increasing interdependence of the ASEAN 
economies, he argued, made it “time that ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention is 
modified to allow ASEAN to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic 
issues with regional implications.”120  To make the Thai bid at modifying the principle 
more palatable before the Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in late July 1998, the 
concept was renamed “flexible engagement.”  This form of engagement was not a 
paradigm shift.  The type of engagement Surin proposed was to be “in the form of peer 
pressure of friendly advice, when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional 
stability.”121  The idea was discussed at length at the AMM, but only the Philippines 
supported the initiative.  As a compromise, ASEAN agreed to a new formula of 
“enhanced interaction.” 
According to John Funston, the controversy that the Thai initiative provoked was 
probably caused more by the suggestion that the principle was being modified than the 
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nature of the proposed change per se.122  However further attempts at modifying the 
principled have been stifled.  ASEAN countries have however addressed the issue in less 
direct ways, particularly economically, but also in regards to tentative steps to take on 
human rights issues.  The 2020 Vision commits ASEAN to establishing “caring 
societies” in which “all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities to total human 
development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural 
background.”123  Further, the 1998 AMM welcomed the establishment of a non-
governmental Working Group on ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. 
ASEAN has demonstrated a limited political means to address the principle with 
varying degrees of success and to modify it to meet the current needs.  Unfortunately, the 
slow evolution of the process will again render ASEAN useless to meet near-term 
unforeseeable situations that may arise requiring a violation of the principle.   
E. MILITARY LIMITATIONS 
Some of the ASEAN states may now consider greater regional peacekeeping 
cooperation in light of East Timor and their uneasiness with Australia taking the lead as 
the “U.S. Deputy Sheriff.”  The requirement to deploy peacekeeping forces at short 
notice to East Timor, and subsequently sustain them, has revealed the weaknesses in the 
rapid deployment capabilities of the 10 members of ASEAN.  Regrettably, “their armed 
forces deficiencies leave them considerably short of an independent intervention 
capacity.”124  
At the Defence Asia ’99 exhibition in Bangkok in November 1999, Suchit 
Bunbongkarn, director of Thailand’s Institute of Security and International Studies, 
pointed out, “ASEAN must be prepared to take more responsibility for peacekeeping 
operations because in Southeast Asia the economic crisis has highlighted the issues of 
human rights and human security as reflected in the case of East Timor.”125  However, as 
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previously mentioned, two factors limit this capability.  First, the principle of non-
intervention, and secondly the capability to rapidly deploy ASEAN member military 
forces. 
Although ASEAN criticized the dominant role the Australians took with U.S. 
assistance, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was the only regional military force 
capable of rapid deployment and command of such a multi-national force.  “The 
deficiencies of the ASEAN armed forces were highlighted by the heavy reliance on ADF 
transport to deploy troops of the 16-nation INTERFET to Dili.”126  Forces from 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand were ferried to Darwin, then boarded Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130 Hercules aircraft or Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
troop ships for deployment to East Timor.  The Philippines and Thailand have a 
considerable number of amphibious transports and landing ships capable of open ocean 
deployment.  However, availability is poor due to a shortage of spare parts, varying states 
of disrepair or low manning levels.  Similar problems limited the number of long-range 
and tactical transport aircraft.  Even if able to deploy, the ability to sustain them is viewed 
skeptically.127 
In addition to the equipment deficiencies, due to the reality of security threats to 
the countries within ASEAN, the truth is that most of these countries have been 
preoccupied with internal threats.  Consequently, their forces, though numerous, have 
been trained and configured to operate close to home and thus with supplies and support 
to hand.128  These priorities are reflected in the White Papers of the various nations.129  
Thus, it must be concluded that ASEAN states, although increasing the procurement of 
modern weapons, will not have the available military capacity to deploy and sustain 
military forces far from their shores without significant assistance from countries capable 
and willing to do so. 
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 F. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE 
Whether ASEAN will develop the mechanisms to resolve conflict in the future is 
debatable.  Since clearly ASEAN was irrelevant in both the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
and East Timor, the outlook that ASEAN will respond positively in the near future looks 
bleak.  ASEAN’s dilemma stems from the fact that it was intended to become a conflict 
resolution organization without a conflict-resolution mechanism.  “Its own modus 
operandi precluded it from having one.”130 ASEAN, to put it bluntly, has failed in its 
attempt to manage both the regional economic crisis and its festering internal security 
problems.  Its doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states has 
only intensified these failures.  ASEAN’s core states—Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore—retain an inflexible commitment to this doctrine despite it irrelevance in an 
increasingly interdependent world.  As not only domestic unrest projects the possibility 
of regional instability, the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism Piracy and illegal narcotics 
demonstrate the transnational issues that will continue to demonstrate the anachronistic 
nature of the ASEAN way.  Nonetheless, until this principle is modified, there is little 
hope that ASEAN or its offshoot the ARF will provide a mechanism or the capability to 
deploy sufficient forces to intervene in future regional crises.  This will continue to be 
conducted by the only countries, both politically and militarily capable of exercising this. 
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IV.  JAPAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Japan is a wealthy country; its economy is the world’s second largest, only behind 
the United States.  The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are the best funded, most technical 
and capable in East Asia, though constrained by their “peace” constitution.  Amazingly, 
Japan does not participate militarily like other great economic powers; it has even 
resisted large-scale involvement in risk adverse peacekeeping missions.  While military 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is uncontroversial for most 
countries, for Japan it entails a plethora of additional implications.  Therefore, the intent 
of this chapter is to review Japan’s policy on UN peacekeeping operations and 
subsequently look at the possibilities for the near future.  To prognosticate Japan’s future 
PKO contributions and evaluate whether it will perform as the willing and capable actor 
necessary for the third characteristic of the ETM, this chapter will present a historical 
background, recent changes to legislation, the evolution of public opinion, and conclude 
with a look at how Japan may participate in future PKOs within Southeast Asia.   
The significance of Japan’s relatively recent venture into peacekeeping and 
concurrently its evolution as an international power requires careful evaluation.  
Fundamentally, we must establish a theoretical framework to determine whether the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) participation in UN peacekeeping conforms or 
departs from the conventions of Japanese international behavior.  According to Aurelia 
George, “to date these conventions have adhered closely to the precepts of the Yoshida 
Doctrine131 and their derivations such as Japan’s reactive mode of international behavior, 
its susceptibility to external and particularly US pressure, and its basic preference for 
using its financial power in international affairs.”132  It has been ten years since Japan re-
initiated the debate, subsequently passed legislation, and deployed the JSDF for PKOs.  
While the PKO bill may have appeared groundbreaking in 1992, we now have had a 
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decade to review Japan’s participation in PKOs.  It appears that Japan has continued to 
conform to its past predisposition to gradually advance towards becoming a normal 
country and that the 1992 PKO bill was merely a step towards that goal.  As Eugene 
Brown explained it, Japan’s decision to participate in UN peacekeeping represents an 
“incremental adaptation within an agreed policy framework.”133  Consequently, Japanese 
participation in UN PKOs is merely a confirmation of pre-existing Japanese foreign 
policy norms, as are the current deployment of Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) 
ships to support the American war against terrorism. 
Whether Japan should participate in international collective security, broadly 
including PKOs, has been an issue of domestic disagreement in Japan since the UN came 
into existence in 1945.  In 1954, when Japan re-established a military under the pretext of 
a “self-defense only” force, a fundamental and longstanding political dispute evolved: 
how and when could the SDF be deployed in regards to collective security or defense?  
Japan’s resistance to participate in any form of military deployment is soundly based in 
both constitutional restrictions and a domestic distaste for active military involvement in 
overseas conflicts for fear of large-scale Japanese re-militarization.  However, one could 
also argue that although Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution does restrict the SDF 
from anything beyond defense of Japan, alternatively there had not been any national 
interest in participating in PKOs until the 1990s.  Determining whether national interests, 
constitutional constraints, or domestic pressure weighs more heavily currently is an 
additional goal of this essay, since it will allow one to predict with greater success the 
possibility of future Japanese SDF participation in Southeast Asian PKOs and its 
potential to fulfill the mandate of the third characteristic of the ETM. 
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
“Japan’s participation in UN peace operations has long suffered from an 
underlying tension between the country’s general support for the United Nations and its 
deep-seated reluctance to use military support.134”  In 1956, the UN General Assembly, 
noting a proud and symbolic moment in post-war history, voted Japan into the United 
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Nations.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) made every effort to play an active 
role in the international organization to demonstrate to the world that Japan was a peace-
loving nation that has discarded its history of aggression.  This provided an initial and 
lasting dilemma for Japan.  Did actively participating in the UN also require Japan to 
contribute its SDF in support of collective security actions, namely peacekeeping?   
When the United States framed the Japanese Constitution, to appease those fearful 
of future Japanese aggression, the 1947 document included an article that renounced war 
and the means to prosecute war.  Article Nine of the Constitution subsequently became 
the shield that the Japanese could hide behind to prevent the formation and deployment of 
a powerful military, whether used aggressively or passively.  Due to the outbreak of the 
Korean War, Japan, under American pressure, altered the interpretation of the 
Constitution and developed the SDF with the introduction of a detailed “SDF Law.”  The 
newly formed SDF was placed under strict limits, under which it could be used and 
deployed.  Under interpretations prevailing during that period, the SDF Law in effect, 
prevented Japan from being involved in any UN sponsored PKO until 1992. 
Domestically, from the early 1950s until the early 1990s, there was a political 
division within Japanese politics about the SDF and its role.  Until the 1990s, the Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) had “strongly favored this 
pacifist approach to foreign policy and were intensely critical of government proposals to 
modify these restrictions.”135  Domestic and international opposition has further 
supported resistance to SDF participation in any international situation.  The LDP, which 
ruled Japan for the entire duration of Japan’s membership in the UN until 1993, yielded 
to this pressure in favor of economic development.  Based on available information, it is 
problematic to validate whether domestic opposition, both political and public, or lack of 
national interests provided the preponderance of resistance to expanded Japanese 
participation in PKOs.   
“According to the government, Japan has made a UN-centered policy one of the 
pillars of its diplomacy and has behaved according.  Japan not only pays high dues but 
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also makes voluntary donations, thereby contributing considerably to UN activities.”136  
Japan has traditionally supported the UN and made significant contributions in both 
money and participation in UN councils and forums.  Since becoming a UN member in 
1956, Japan has regarded cooperation with the United Nations as an important pillar in its 
foreign policy, and it has cooperated widely in peace-oriented activities undertaken with 
the United Nations at the center, such as PKOs.137  In its inaugural edition, Japan’s 
Diplomatic Bluebook in 1957 posited a “UN-centered diplomacy” as one of “three 
pillars” of Japanese diplomacy.  Having proclaimed a UN-centered diplomacy, Japan 
inferred it would take an active role in collective security.  Consequently, on two 
occasions during the 1950s and 1960s, the UN requested Japanese participation in PKOs.  
Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya argue that the MOFA wanted to participate, but Japan’s 
conservative political leaders, who would later in the century favor such a role, wanted to 
regain economic prosperity and placed a much higher emphasis on this.  By not 
embroiling themselves in foreign policy issues and debates and concentrating on their 
primary goal, Japan consistently rejected UN requests for SDF participation despite 
MOFA support.  Furthermore, the Cold War environment did not allow Japan to pursue a 
“UN centered diplomacy” very much.  Within a few years, the Diplomatic Bluebook 
ceased to use the concept of “three pillars” and pragmatically began emphasizing the bi-
lateral relationship with the United States, rooted in the U.S.-Japan security treaty. 
The initial request for Japanese participation in PKOs came in 1958, shortly after 
Japan had been elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.  On 11 
June 1958, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that called for the formation of 
an observation group (United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon-UNOGIL) to 
monitor the illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the Lebanese border.  As the 
situation deteriorated in Lebanon, Japan sought to defuse the situation by recommending 
that the UN increase the size of the mission in Lebanon, ultimately sparking debate 
within Japan concerning a possible SDF role in peacekeeping.  Due to Japan’s 
the Secretary-General of the UN assumed that Japan was proposition of the resolution,                                                  
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willing to participate in UNOGIL and requested Japan send ten SDF officers to Lebanon.  
Japan denied the request because SDF missions outlined in Article Three of the SDF Law 
did not include UN duties.  “It is certainly true that the SDF Law did not specifically 
include provisions for sending the SDF abroad, but neither did it forbid such a 
decision.”138  Despite its proclaimed “UN centered diplomacy” in 1958 and its avowed 
interest in international UN-centered collective security, domestic support both within the 
populace and the government was not yet prepared to support sending the SDF 
participation in UN operations.139  In the 1960s, Japan would be queried again with much 
the same results. 
The newly independent Congo requested UN troops in July 1960 after Belgium 
unilaterally sent forces into its former colony to restore order.  The UN mission in the 
Congo would eventually become the largest PKO undertaken to that time.  There was no 
formal request for Japanese participation in the operation, but there were rumors that the 
UN was inquiring into whether Japan would be willing to send troops.140  Unlike the 
mission in Lebanon, the situation in the Congo required UN peacekeepers to quell 
violence.  Consequently, the UN passed Resolution 161 urging UN Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC) to take all appropriate measures, including the use of force, which 
effectively prevented any SDF participation.  Nonetheless, in early 1961, “the statement 
by Japan’s then ambassador to the United Nations aroused a controversy.”141  He ignited 
debate by questioning how Japan could have an UN-centered diplomacy and yet not 
contribute to peacekeeping operations.  He argued, “Because the United Nations will be 
responsible for the future world order, a UN police force ought to be considered.  It 
would not be reasonable for Japan to remain unalterably opposed to sending troops 
abroad.”142   
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This view which became known as the “Matsudaira statement,” was attacked in 
the Diet on the grounds it was proposing the dispatch of troops when law prohibited it.  
An editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun “linked pressure for SDF participation in UN 
peacekeeping with a broader LDP effort to revise Article Nine,”143 which initiated the 
longstanding debate that any increase in the roles and missions of the SDF would 
inherently lead to remilitarization.  Thus, by the 1960s legally and politically Japan was 
not yet prepared to fully participate as an UN member. 
To contribute more forthrightly in the UN, Japan would need to revise the legal 
framework, either through altering the SDF Law or the Constitution, to participate in any 
PKO.  Seeking the path to least resistance, the initial attempt, the UN Resolutions 
Cooperation Bill, was initiated by the MOFA in 1966.  The bill, which would have 
changed the SDF Law, was surrounded with controversy, stalled and was never brought 
before the Diet.  This initial attempt was consequently quickly rescinded, discarded, and 
would not be reappear as an issue for an additional three decades.144  Heinreich, Shibata, 
and Soeya argue that the governing LDP was far more concerned with continuing with 
rebuilding and integrating the Japanese economy into the global economy and avoiding 
misinterpretation both at home and abroad of their intentions. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan was economically prosperous.  
Concurrently, it appeared that the United States had decreased its commitment to East 
Asia by its removal of all troops from Vietnam and some from Korea under President 
Nixon, with threats of further reductions under President Carter.  These two factors 
established an argument both domestically and abroad for greater Japanese participation 
in shouldering more security responsibility.  In response, the Nomura Research Institute 
in 1977 prepared a study on the future of Japanese security policies, under a commission 
from the Japanese government and with the participation of senior Japanese officials.  
One of its recommendations was that Japan should consider sending its troops abroad for 
the first time since WWII in the context of UN peacekeeping operations.145  In 1980, a 
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panel composed of mid-level MOFA bureaucrats circulated a report declaring, “with 
respect to UN peacekeeping operations, a positive discussion should take place on the 
contribution of personnel in addition to financial cooperation.  The dispatch of personnel 
to UN peacekeeping operations is considered for our country, which desires to exist as a 
peaceful state.”146  Although SDF personnel were not specifically mentioned, it is readily 
apparent that their participation would be required.  Nonetheless, in 1980 the official 
government position of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki’s cabinet and again by Prime 
Minister Nakasone in 1983 was to continue to hold the issue at arms length by reiterating 
the longstanding official view, namely that there would be no SDF participation in UN 
operations if the use of armed force was to be contemplated.147   
The 1980s did begin to see changes in Japan’s security outlook.  Although not 
directly applicable to peacekeeping, changes in policy would ultimately have links to 
expanded SDF participation in Japanese security.  An example of this change occurred in 
1981, when the government established a sea-lane defense perimeter 1,000 miles out 
from the Japanese coastline.  Further expansion of SDF roles under Nakasone, allowed 
his successor Noboru Takeshita to take concrete steps to expand Japan’s involvement in 
international affairs, while simultaneously UN participation in PKOs was about to greatly 
increase.  In parallel with these initiatives was the closure of the Cold War, which would 
reinvigorate the role the United Nations would play in conflict resolution.148  Without the 
restrictions incurred under the East-West conflict, the UN was now able and expected to 
play a larger role in conflict management, particularly as the number of missions that 
would arise increased vastly.   
When Noburu Takeshita became prime minister in November 1987, he proposed 
shortly after being posted to the job an “International Cooperation Initiative” in 1988.  
The proposal, referred to “three pillars of international cooperation,” consisting of 1) 
cooperation for peace, 2) promotion of international cultural exchange, and 3) increase in 
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official development aid (ODA).149  Within this policy, Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya 
identify five areas in which Japan could place a larger international role:  
• Active pursuit of diplomatic efforts aimed at strengthening 
political dialogue and international cooperation 
• Stepped-up contributions for UN-sponsored activities to prevent 
the outbreak of conflict 
• Active involvement in international efforts to resolve disputes 
peacefully  
• Strengthened assistance to refugees through both bilateral and 
multilateral efforts; and vigorous contributions-in terms of money 
and personnel-to international cooperative efforts aimed at 
reconstruction once a conflict is peacefully resolved.150   
In 1988, Japan sent one civilian to the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan and another civilian to the UN monitoring operations on the Iran-Iraq truce.  
In the following years, Japan assigned thirty-one civilian observers to the election 
monitoring team in Namibia and six civilian observers to join in monitoring the 
Nicaraguan elections.  “Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s, no serious debates had 
taken place as to the possibility, let alone the desirability, of sending SDF on UN 
missions.”151  However, thoughts of further SDF involvement began to appear, as 
indicative of a statement to the Diet in November 1989 by Juro Matsumoto, the Director 
General of the Japan Defense Agency.  The Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) 
quoted him saying he was “considering authorizing the use of troops for anti-terrorist 
operations, protecting Japanese nationals overseas and in international peacekeeping 
activities.”152  Prime Minister Toshiko Kaifu had made a similar speech to the Diet in 
October 1989 hinting at similar interests, which FEER commented was the “standard 
Japanese approach towards implementing a sensitive policy.”153 
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Thus, by 1990 Japan had “got its foot in the door,”154 but convincing the public 
and the opposition that the SDF should be included for Japan to realistically participate as 
a peacekeeper.  While viewing the involvement of government personnel as acceptable, 
the opposition parties continued to view participation of the SDF in UN peacekeeping  
“as part of a Machiavellian strategy by conservatives to expand Japan’s military role 
abroad.”155  Yozo Yokota concurs with this assessment proclaiming:  
The government’s stated policy of making a tangible contribution to security-
related areas (in other words, providing personnel as well as funds to PKO activities) is 
not motivated by Japan’s so-called UN-centered diplomacy; it is just a pretext for the 
government’s attempt to make the overseas dispatch of units of the Self-Defense Forces a 
fait accompli.156 
Public support in the late 1980s remained ambivalent as well.  An opinion poll 
taken by the Prime Minister’s Office in early 1989 concluded that forty-seven percent of 
respondents were opposed to sending the SDF abroad to participate in UN PKOs, while 
only twenty-two percent were in favor.  Yet, the survey indicated that seventy-two 
percent were prepared to send the SDF abroad for the purpose of disaster rescue 
operations.  A culmination of international events, the 1991 Gulf War and the break-up of 
the USSR, would become the turning point. 
The Persian Gulf War provided the catalyst that would ultimately lead to the 
introduction of a bill that would authorize SDF involvement in UN-sanctioned 
peacekeeping.  When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the Japanese government 
supported economic sanctions against Iraq, and provided generous financial assistance 
both to countries affected by the invasion and to the multinational coalition forces 
protecting Saudi Arabia.  Under pressure from the United States to provide more than just 
economic assistance, Japan attempted to introduce a bill that would authorize the SDF to 
provide logistical support and allow participation in traditional peacekeeping missions.  
The first attempt, which was centered on the “United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill,” 
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failed well before being introduced to the House of Representatives.  During that time 
period, the LDP had a majority in the lower house, but the opposition parties controlled 
the House of Councilors and made it clear that they would not cooperate with the bill.157  
This failure to provide military personnel, even minimally and not in conflict, provoked 
strong criticism from the United States and some European countries.158  Japan was 
accused of resorting to checkbook diplomacy, and at the conclusion of the war Kuwait 
pointedly excluded Japan from a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, 
thanking those countries that provided assistance.  Considering that seventy percent of 
Japan’s oil comes from the Middle East, and suffering intense international criticism, the 
government sent a flotilla of minesweepers to the gulf after the war had ended.159   
Failure of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in October of 1990 can be 
attributed to domestic politics, primarily because the Japanese public did not support the 
bill.  Various public opinion polls conducted in the fall of 1990 indicated that only twenty 
to thirty percent of the Japanese supported the bill.160  However, by the spring of 1991 
seventy-five percent of the Japanese public supported the decision to deploy the ships, an 
almost fifty percent difference from a mere six months previous.  According to another 
poll conducted in July 1992, fifty-eight percent of those surveyed considered the dispatch 
of the SDF “problematic under the Constitution.”161  Regardless, with the momentum 
instigated by the Gulf War, the LDP capitalized and convened a “Special Study Group on 
Japan’s Role in the International Community.” 
The group, chaired by LDP General-Secretary Ozawa, was subsequently referred 
to as the “Ozawa Commission.”  Ozawa was the strongest supporter of the LDP wing that 
supported Japanese SDF participation in the Gulf War.  Ozawa argued:  
With the end of the East-West Cold War, the concept of ‘collective 
security’ centered on the United Nations is being utilized.  ‘Collective 
security’ based on the UN Charter is supposed to protect the global order.  
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Its character is different from the use of the concept of ‘collective self-
defense,’ that the government has considered unconstitutional.  I believe 
the ideals of our constitution and the UN Charter are identical.  In order to 
preserve the constitutional principles of non-use of force and renunciation 
of war, we need to supplement (our defense efforts) with the collective 
security system centered on the United Nations.162 
Consequently, when the Commission’s report was released on February 20, 1992, it 
recommended Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations.163  However even 
before this, the government had introduced a bill almost a year after the ill-fated UN 
Peace Cooperation Bill was killed before introduction.  This second attempt began where 
the first had ended, in the introduction of a “Peacekeeping Battalion” or “Peace 
Cooperation Corps” composed of civilians.  The Socialist Party (JSP), which was 
adamantly opposed to any dispatch of SDF personnel to the Gulf War for any reasons 
before the summer of 1991, was not opposed to Japanese participation in peacekeeping 
per se.  But in the summer of 1991, after three groups of Diet members from the LDP, the 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Komeito, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) returned 
from their observation of actual UN peacekeeping operations abroad, the LDP, Komeito 
and the DSP shifted away from the agreement about an all-civilian peacekeeping corps to 
one which would require SDF participation.  Thus, as of the fall of 1991, the three parties 
had to create the conditions in which the JSP would concede and allow the SDF to deploy 
for peacekeeping. 
Aside from the JSP and the Communist Party, public and party opinions had 
shifted sharply because of the Gulf War and endorsed the Ozawa opinions, which now 
paralleled the LDP, Komeito, and DSP positions.164  Now the three parties had to develop 
legislation that would allow the dispatch the SDF without being condemned for violating 
the Constitution, and maintain a broad acceptance by all three parties.  The tool was the 
introduction of the “Five Peacekeeping Operations Principles” which were included in 
the PKO bill introduced in September 1991.  The principles are as follows: 
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• Agreement on ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties of the 
conflict. 
• The parties of the conflict, including the territorial state(s) shall have given 
their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping forces and Japan’s 
participation in the force. 
• The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring 
any party in the conflict. 
• Should any of the above guidelines requirements cease to be satisfied, the 
government of Japan may withdraw its contingent. 
• Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the 
lives of personnel.165 
Another issue helped break the deadlock.  Komeito proposed in the spring of 1992 to 
“freeze” the co-called “core” missions of peacekeeping forces—monitoring disarmament, 
patrolling ceasefires zones, inspecting the disposal of abandoned weapons—until such 
time as a new separate law would “unfreeze” these missions.  (In reality, the bill to 
“unfreeze” the PKO bill was not considered until 2001 and will be discussed later).  The 
LDP and the DSP agreed with Komeito on the “freeze.”  To seal the success of the bill, 
despite JSP opposition, the LDP and Komeito further agreed to accept the DSP demand 
that all PKOs would require Diet approval.166 
On 15 June 1992, the LDP and its political allies finally managed to push the 
legislation through the Diet after three, often stormy Diet sessions.  According to Hisashi 
Owada, the former Japanese ambassador to the UN and top Foreign Ministry official at 
the time, “the establishment of the peacekeeping law in 1992 was a epoch-making event 
for Japan.”167  Two months after the law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Bill) went into effect thirty-six 
years after Japan took a seat the UN General Assembly.  Shortly after initiation, Japan 
did dispatch troops on PKO missions, “but their numbers have been minimal and their 
participation has been hedged with so many conditions [established in PKO bill] that they 
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have been hard to utilize.”168  Nonetheless, we must quickly review those missions Japan 
has participated in. 
A conference in Paris of interested UN members had reached agreement in early 
1991 on a political settlement for war-torn Cambodia, and the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established on 28 February 1992.  In 
September 1992, “despite public concern at home,”169 the Japanese government sent to 
Cambodia a 600-man engineering battalion, seventy-five civilian police officers, and 
eight military observers.  “This was the first and, to date, largest deployment of military 
personnel since the end of World War II.”170 
Japan’s new international role as a peacekeeper soon faced a domestic test shortly 
after deploying.  In early 1993, two of the Japanese members of UNTAC, one election 
observer, and one civilian policeman were killed by guerillas in Cambodia, “causing 
serious concern and controversy in Japan.”171  Although the cease-fire agreement was 
formally observed, in reality the situation was like a civil war.  It was obvious the SDF 
had joined UNTAC operations as a part of the regular peacekeeping forces there, versus 
the explanation given to the public that they were there to repair and build bridges.  In the 
end, Japanese participation in UNTAC was a watershed event for Japan, “but it had been 
relatively easy to generate support and enthusiasm for the Cambodian operation because 
Japan had a strong interest in Southeast Asian affairs and numerous ties in the region”172  
UNTAC was deemed a success, particularly in regards to the concurrent mission 
in Somalia that ended in disaster, but Japanese participation was more symbolic than a 
significant contribution.  UNTAC reached 22,000 international troops, making Japan’s 
participation less than one percent of the total force.  Public support of participation was 
fragile, and the “Japanese public tended to justify the dispatch of SDF troops largely in 
terms of satisfying foreign criticism of Japan’s failure to make personnel available to 
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international peacekeeping.”173  Japanese public discussion held that it was necessary for 
Japan to make a symbolic contribution to satisfy this criticism.  Militarily, the SDF 
“operated under a bewildering set of rules of engagement.”174  If taken literally, the SDF 
could not fire on the Khmer Rouge to protect a non-Japanese because it would represent 
an exercise of the right of collective self-defense, which the PKO bill had ruled out.  
Evidently and for obvious reasons the “UN officials were reportedly bitter over the 
special circumstances under which the Japanese peacekeepers operated.”175  Even the 
Japanese head of UNTAC, Yasushi Akashi compared the SDF to “maidens” because they 
were rather “timid and tentative.”  He described the Japanese participation as “teething 
experiences.”176  After the Japanese participants were killed, the Japanese media, public, 
and portions of the Diet demanded withdrawal from UNTAC.  The LDP government 
prevailed through the controversy nevertheless and maintained the SDF participants in 
UNTAC.   
In other respects Japanese participation looked dismal, as twenty Japanese 
policemen, nearly a third of the total fled their assignments, taking their UN vehicles 
back to the safety of Phnom Penh.  Furthermore, four Japanese peacekeepers deserted the 
country and drove their UN vehicles across the border to Thailand, taking refuge in the 
Japanese embassy in Bangkok.177  A senior UN official remarked, “the only time the 
Japanese were tested by fire, they abandoned us.  We understand the special 
constitutional restrictions on the Japanese, but in a situation of undeniable danger, how 
can we repeatedly ask people of one nationality, but not another, to take risks.”178  
Nevertheless, since Cambodia, Japan has participated in nine other missions, including in 
Mozambique, El Salvador, and the Golan Heights in limited numbers.  One notable 
exception was East Timor, which did not fit within the constraints of the “Five 
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Principles” hailing again another round of criticisms that Japan was not fulfilling its role 
as the second largest economic power in the world, and largest in East Asia. 
Politically, one of the most significant events that would alter the potential future 
of the SDF’s participation in PKOs occurred when the first Socialist prime minister in 
fifty years now headed the Cabinet.  In June 1994, Tomiichi Murayama, Chairman of the 
former Socialist party—renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)—became 
prime minister in a coalition government.  For decades, the Socialists had denounced the 
SDF as unconstitutional, and called for ending the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.  It 
continuously opposed any form of peacekeeping legislation and SDF participation in UN 
PKOs.  Amazingly, within days of taking office, Prime Minister Murayama announced 
his government would support and maintain the US-Japan treaty and accepted the 
constitutionality of the SDF.  At the party convention in September of that year, with just 
over sixty percent of the party approving, the party’s platform was reversed.179  “In other 
words there was no essential disagreement at all with the evolution of the previous 
several years, which had come to pass over the fierce opposition of the SDPJ and a final 
dramatic filibuster that the party had staged in June 1992 before the peacekeeping 
legislation came to a vote.180  This apparent shift in the SDPJ’s position would not ensure 
that Japanese participation in PKOs would come without domestic politics proving to be 
another major obstacle.  As an example, in the early months of 1994 the International 
Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCHQ), the Japanese Government agency responsible 
for PKOs, approached the coalition government about sending the SDF to participate in 
the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights.  Socialist 
members of the coalition raised objections over the potential dangers of having the SDF 
handle transportation of ammunition and armed soldiers.  According to these members, 
this could be interpreted as a violation of the Constitution and Japanese law, which 
prohibited the use of force.  Finally, in August of 1995, the coalition parties finally 
reached a compromise.  To ensure the SDF would not become entangled in conflict, they 
were forbidden from transporting ammunition or foreign combat troops or participate in 
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UN training exercises that used live ammunition.  Again, the SDF was deployed to 
another PKO in which Japanese law effectively made them nearly ineffective if any type 
of hostility developed. 
C. EAST TIMOR 
A UN mission that requires a closer look is Japan’s failure to send SDF troops to 
East Timor as a member of INTERFET.  Japan has vital strategic and economic interests 
in Indonesia, which leads one to expect that Japan would have been required to send 
more than just money.  After a lengthy delay, Australia took the lead in INTERFET, with 
the assistance of significant U.S. logistical support, and provided some 4,500 out of an 
estimated 7,500 troops.181  China, a conservative participant in peacekeeping, “stole a 
march on Japan by promising to send civilian police.”182  International pressure again 
mounted that Japan must reconsider revising its PKO Bill.  “Tokyo’s reluctance suggests 
that recent reports that Japan is now ready to reassert its diplomatic and military power in 
East Asia as part of its existing security alliance with the United States, especially to deal 
with the North Korean nuclear threat, must be viewed with skepticism.”183  The 
prominent French Paper Le Monde branded Japan as a “coward” for not facing up to the 
crisis.  Japanese newspapers have also been critical of Tokyo’s policy and called on the 
government to exercise more leadership in Asian affairs.  “Why did Indonesia’s greatest 
provider of aid not use its might earlier to persuade Indonesia to accept an international 
peacekeeping force?” asked the conservative Nihon Kezai Shimbun?184  Two years and a 
half years after INTERFET was dispatched, Japan finally sent a contingent of 680 SDF 
members to East Timor, after only sending three civilian police officers in 1999.185  
However, the Japanese are only providing engineering support to build roads and bridges, 
not actually keeping the peace, that will be left to a South Korean infantry division 
assigned to that mission.  While public support for PKO activities has gradually grown so 
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that nearly eighty percent of the population supports the SDF’s participation in PKO 
activities, questionable is the support of Japan assuaging the Americans, taking a larger 
regional role as a “deputy” regional hegemon, and fulfilling the third characteristic of the 
ETM by leading future PKOs.186 
D. JAPAN’S SUPPORT FOR THE “WAR AGAINST TERRORISM” 
 Obviously Japanese participation in UN PKOs, since the introduction of the 
Peacekeeping Bill, is still conducted with significant caution and domestic political 
deliberation.  Since the introduction of the bill, the public has generally supported it, but 
it is still reserved about the use of SDF in any operation that may involve combat.  The 
government has echoed this position, but elements within the MOFA and the IPCHQ 
have continued to press for further SDF participation in UN PKOs.  However, until 
present, the Socialists in particular have continued to subject each situation in which 
Japan is asked to participate with intense scrutiny to ensure the conditions (Five 
Principles) of the Peacekeeping Law are met. 
Therefore, having managed to set a foot in the door of peacekeeping, what are the 
recent attempts to secure and relax the constraints that inhibit Japan’s ability to 
participate in a wider range of operations?  As of March 2002, Japan is only providing 
467 personnel, less than other Asian countries such as South Korea, and in 27th place as a 
contributor to UN PKOs.187  Japan is the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping 
in terms of money, but it has yet to participate militarily in kind.188  Since its inception, 
the PKO law was under scrutiny for revision to allow greater participation in 
international PKOs.  The initial freeze that was established for three years extended for 
nine.  Another “turning point” occurred on September 11, 2001.  The terrorist attacks on 
the United States provided a new opportunity to revise the SDF Law.  On October 30, 
Japan passed an Anti-Terrorism Law, which authorized the deployment of SDF forces to 
provide support for US forces engaged in Afghanistan.  “The Self-Defense Forces are 
finally crossing the line to participate in a real war for the first time in their history, even 
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though their role will be limited to logistic support.”189  The government-sponsored bill 
that enables service members to provide non-combat and humanitarian support to U.S. 
and multinational forces was approved in the House of Councilors on the majority 
strength of the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito and New 
Conservative Party.  The Democratic Party of Japan opposed the bill because it does not 
force the government to seek Diet approval before the SDF is dispatched.  The quick 
legislative action reflects changes in public attitudes.  A Kyodo News poll showed that 
fifty-seven percent of the respondents supported the antiterrorism bill and sixty-three 
percent approved US military action against terrorism.190  On its heels was a revision of 
the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Bill (PKO Bill) that is to pave the way for 
expanded participation in UN PKOs.  On 7 December 2001, the PKO law was approved 
by the Diet.  The revised PKO law calls for an end to the self-imposed freeze on the 
participation of the JSDF in UN PKOs and will significantly loosen the restrictions on the 
use of weapons.191  However, authorizing to use weapons to defend foreign troops and 
officials remain ambiguous.  “Vagueness once again is prevailing in crucial legislation, 
making it not any different from the PKO Law implemented in 1992,” concludes the 
Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun.192  Nonetheless, because of the limitations of both Article 
Nine and the vague PKO bill, Japan lacks the material to provide a significant capability. 
E. MILITARY LIMITATIONS 
With regard to the location of Japanese support for UN peacekeeping missions, 
particularly in a logistics support role, “the SDF can render little support, so far as airlift 
and sealift capabilities are concerned.”193  The largest transport aircraft that the Air SDF 
has is C-130 Hercules, and it only has fifteen of them.  Although the C-130 is a capable 
aircraft, it has limited range and payload, restricting the distance and gear they could 
provide either the SDF or whomever they may be supporting.  The best the Japanese 
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could do is procuring airlift capabilities that the Japanese sector does possess.  According 
to Nishihara, even this option is hard to realize based on historical examples given in the 
Gulf War.  During that conflict, the U.S. government asked Japan whether it could 
procure commercial planes to help transport American troops and equipment from the 
continental United States to the Middle East.  “The government had to decline because 
the trade unions of Japan Airlines and All Nipon Airways refused to positively receive 
the request on the grounds of the risky nature of their assignments.”194  Eventually the 
Japanese government had to procure American commercial airplanes, which 
demonstrates the possibility of potentially using Ukrainian or Russian IL-76, under lease 
if required.  Recently, Japan announced the purchase of Boeing 767s for midair refueling, 
which is obviously a step in the right direction and a possible indication of their 
willingness to procure other strategic aircraft.195  Of course having an air facility capable 
of handling and servicing large aircraft, particularly in a location where the equipment is 
needed, is a requirement and possibly not a luxury under a future PKO.  Thus, the 
possibility of sealift must be entertained. 
As for sealift, Japan could follow the Australian lead of leasing high-speed 
shipping to augment their limited diesel-powered naval ships, which can sail for a short 
distance.  Landing ships were dispatched to Cambodia to support the Engineer Battalion 
of Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) participating in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations,196 but having an appropriate location in which to disembark their equipment 
and supplies hinders them.  Consequently, the Maritime SDF further lacks the helicopter 
assets to facilitate a large-scale offload of material, supplies, and equipment.    
F. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE 
The real test is yet to come on whether Japan will participate as a “normal” 
country in a peacekeeping operation either in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.  Japan’s 
previous reluctance to participate in the East Timor crisis, due to constitutional, legal and 
public distaste for Japanese participation in PKOs, demonstrates Japan will not lead or 
contribute large numbers of troops in a near future operation in Southeast Asia.  
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Unfortunately, the recent legislation still limits Japanese from taking a leading role and 
provides ambiguity into the real responsibility Japan is willing to accept.  Concerning the 
logistical support role that Japan its potentially willing to offer, the means of approving 
such support will still be complicated.  “This will involve Japan’s constitutional debates 
and thus political constraints.”197  The debates will follow along that issue that has 
prevailed in the past:  What is the nature of the peacekeeping mission, and where will it 
occur?   
Optimists point towards Japan recent participation and support for US forces 
operating in the War Against Terrorism, but this is primarily logistics support.  The 
limited military equipment the JSDF operate restricts even the logistics support provided 
to the U.S. coalition forces.  Thus, if both Japan and the United States are both only 
willing to provide logistics support, then the questions remains unanswered in who will 
provide the combat forces.  However, it is also important to point out that Japan has in 
the past entertained the notion of the United States supporting logistically Japanese PKOs 
with transportation and food-supply services, particularly to remote areas.198  This is a 
significant shift in previous Japanese policies, and must be understood as a continuing 
evolution in Japanese participation in PKOs. 
Japan’s participation in peacekeeping is another step and a continued evolution of 
its foreign policy.  It does not indicate a radical departure, and we can therefore expect 
that Japan will continue to expand its international role, gradually abandon its “global 
civilian power” status, and continue to react to U.S. pressure until the foreseeable future.  
In conclusion, regardless of the minimal alteration of the PKO bill originally passed in 
1992, which allows Japan to legally participate in future PKOs, and signs of Japan’s 
willingness to contribute on a larger scale, a significant amount of both domestic and 
international baggage will still preclude them from taking a significant role or the lead.  
Regionally, many countries are still leery of Japan previous militaristic ways and will 
resist any large scale Japanese PKO mission, even if sanctioned by the UN.  This 
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pressure, which will be supported by domestic opponents to Japan’s increased role, will 
likely prevent Japan from procuring the appropriate assets to conduct a UN PKO without 
having to lease the assets.  Consequently, Japan will have to continue to build confidence, 
particularly in East Asia through multi-lateral dialogue organizations such as the ARF 
and CSCAP.   
To deepen understanding of PKOs and ensure more effective cooperation, 
Japan has also held a series of seminars, including a seminar co-hosted 
with Canada and Malaysia in March within the framework of ARF under 
the theme of ‘The Changing Face of Peacekeeping,’ where a wide-ranging 
exchange of views was conducted on the various issues facing today's 
PKOs.199 
Another good example of this is Japan’s participation in the “Southeast Asian Peace 
Symposium,” which promotes the development of peace operations capabilities, such as 
promoting the interoperability between armed forces, and which emphasizes rules of 
engagement under international laws, treaties, and customs.200   
Japan’s political limitations will restrain the Japanese from taking a leadership 
role in a near-future Southeast Asian peacekeeping.  However, the current reevaluation of 
Japanese legislation demonstrates a real possibility, particularly under American 
pressure, to accept the role that the US government desires in the next 10-20 years.  
Constraining this will be Japan’s military limitations, which must concurrently evolve to 
meet the requirements to fulfill the needs of a coalition leader.  Assuming Japan weathers 
its current economic problems, the Japanese have the greatest economic and military 
potential to accept at least a co-leadership role in any future Southeast Asia PKO and 
potential subsume the leadership role the United States desires under characteristic three 
of the ETM. 
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V.  CHINA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this chapter is to demonstrate that China has a skeptical and 
paradoxical view of peacekeeping, which stems from China’s ambivalent view of its 
security.  Thus, China will consequently neither take a leadership role in future PKOs in 
Southeast Asia nor fulfill the role the United States deems necessary under the third 
characteristic of the ETM.  This was particularly highlighted in the 1990s as China 
uncomfortably looked for its proper place in the “New World Order.”  With the exception 
of UNTAC in Cambodia, not one major peacekeeping operation has remotely threatened 
China’s “territorial” security.  Yet, China often views UN peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs) as a violation of a country’s sovereignty, and as a result it treats them as a threat 
to Chinese security.  The concept of national sovereignty serves to sustain domestic 
authority against foreign incursions.  “For the Chinese leadership, defense of a ‘thick’ 
notion of sovereignty also serves its efforts to enhance its legitimacy, to deflect criticism 
of its domestic politics, and to resist outside involvement in the Taiwan issue.”201  China 
views UN PKOs suspiciously because Beijing does not want to establish a precedent that 
might erode the 19th century definition of state sovereignty or increase the likelihood of 
multilateral interventions in the internal affairs of states.  “Specifically, China has 
justified its opposition in terms of sovereignty in order to safeguard Chinese sovereignty 
from future intervention.”202  In recent decades, China has faced growing separatist 
movements in Tibet, Xinxiang, and Mongolia.  Further, Taiwan gradually appears to be 
moving closer to independence, confirmed by the results of the recent elections.  These 
indications and the rise of “non-traditional” PKOs explain why the Chinese leadership 
has increasingly emphasized the importance of national sovereignty in UN speeches and 
voting habits.  Thus, China has placed the protection of the “Westphalian” norm of state 
sovereignty within the bounds of its national security, which conforms to China’s 
traditional realpolitik view of the world. 
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B. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
Yongjin Zhang argues that China has had various positions on UN peacekeeping, 
ranging from “unreserved condemnation to active participation.”203  He argues that China 
has changed its position from antagonism in the 1950s and 1960s to antipathy in the 
1970s, and then to active participation in the 1980s and 1990s.  Analytically he identifies 
four periods in the evolution of the Chinese policy towards peacekeeping in the last 45 
years.  The period of condemnation dates from 1950 to 1971, when China was excluded 
from the UN.  The period of non-disruption lasts from 1971 to 1981.  The period of 
cooperation spans the years 1981 to 1988.  The period of participation starts in 1988 and 
prevails today.  Samuel S. Kim narrows this definition to the years since China occupied 
a permanent seat on the Security Council.  He defines China’s evolution in three stages: 
(1) principled opposition/non-participation (1971-1981), (2) support/participation (1982-
1989), and (3) contingent support/minimal participation (1990-present).204  While both 
these arguments are useful, it is more fitting and parsimonious to divide Chinese views 
on peacekeeping into just two phases: Maoism and Dengism.  The first period, Maoism, 
extends from 1949 until the late 1970s, while the second period, Dengism, extends from 
1980 until present.  Both Kim and Zhang’s third period, while different, are equally 
problematic.  Both assume something changed in China’s approach to peacekeeping, and 
more broadly its approach to foreign policy.  Alternatively, what this chapter intends to 
do is demonstrate that China evolving policy towards peacekeeping—both in 
participation and support—has changed only once to conform to internal changes within 
Chinese politics that emphasized economic reform and opening to the world.  China 
adjusted its policy on PKOs in the 1980s but has always adhered to the same principle in 
regards to peacekeeping.  China has repeatedly placed sovereignty and its correlation 
with security atop its list of vital national interests, and this is readily demonstrated 
through its translucent position in regards to peacekeeping. 
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Since 1949, but most clearly demonstrated after 1971,  “Beijing was critical of the 
general notion of UN peacekeeping until the 1980s”205 and opposed the creation and 
continuation of all peacekeeping operations (PKOs).  China demonstrated its opposition 
to the three PKOs that occurred during this period (1971-1981) by not participating in the 
Security Council votes (abstaining), not paying its annual peacekeeping dues, and not 
donating troops to on-going operations.  By summoning arguments from the period 
before the PRC’s representation in the UN, Beijing justified its nonparticipation of voting 
in support of or engaging in peacekeeping.  M. Taylor Fravel argues that China’s 
antipathy towards the UN and peacekeeping until 1981 was entrenched in Mao’s 
ideological view of “just war.”  Fravel argued in an essay for Asian Survey that China 
opposed all peacekeeping operations because they represented a hegemonic intervention 
by the superpowers in the affairs of small states, a policy that was influenced by Maoism.  
Support for this ideological argument stems from China’s general disfavor and vocal 
disregard with the UN before becoming a member in 1971, but it ignores China’s 
international situation.  During the 1960s, a variety of articles published China’s distaste 
for the international organization.  The Peking Review published a series of articles 
concomitantly with Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN condemning the organization.  
A 10 January 1965 editorial of Renmin Ribao alleged that the United Nations was simply 
a “pliant tool of US imperialism.”206  An ideologically based argument discounts the 
significance of China’s international situation during the 1960s and its confrontation with 
U.S.-led UN forces in the early 1950s.  Accordingly, caution must be exercised in 
arguing that it was simply Mao’s theory of just war that viewed peacekeeping as an act of 
superpower “power politics.”   
We must also consider the following.  First, until 1971 China was excluded from 
the global organization.  An outsider, China and the CCP were free to criticize the 
organization utilizing ideological rhetoric to support its domestic legitimacy while it 
endured the Cultural Revolution.  Furthermore, after the Sino-Soviet split China was 
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internationally isolated and confronted both superpowers throughout the 1960s.  
Throughout the decade, China rhetorically regarded the UN under direct American 
control and influence, (subsequently in concert with Soviets in this regards) thus 
misleading scholars into believing China’s foreign policy was ideologically driven.  The 
United States and, later, the USSR were China’s avowed enemies during this period.  
China sincerely believed the UN was a tool to expand and justify American and Soviet 
influence and interests, ultimately compromising Chinese security not an ideological 
conflict.  This was overtly demonstrated in Korea, which provided lasting memories for 
Chinese leaders. 
“The Chinese bore a specific deep and bitter resentment against UN peacekeeping 
as a result of the Korean War.”207  Under the UN auspices, the United States led a 
multinational force to oppose both North Korean and Chinese aggression in 1950.  UN 
operations in Korea were peacemaking rather than peacekeeping, but to the Chinese there 
was no distinction between them.  China was condemned and on the receiving end of the 
largest collective security operation mounted by the UN, providing a harsh example of 
superpower influence within the UN.  This resentment still appears.  In October 2000, 
President Jiang Zemin was quoted at a gathering in the Great Hall of the People.  In his 
speech to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the dispatching of the CPV (Chinese 
People’s Volunteers) to Korea he stated: 
The victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is a great 
victory of the world’s peace-loving people, a heroic feat to defend justice 
and fight against hegemony, a splendid epic of patriotism and 
revolutionary heroism, and a grand monument erected by the Chinese 
people in maintaining world peace and human progress.208 
Evidently, the Korean War provided a lasting impression of the UN as a threat to Chinese 
security, and, as a result, the Chinese have always looked at the UN and peacekeeping 
operations warily. 
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When Deng Xiaoping ascended to the leadership, he understood the importance of 
opening to the world economically.  Pragmatically, the forthcoming Chinese leadership 
in the late 1970s viewed the UN as a tool to expand Chinese national economic interests, 
and subsequently altered Beijing’s position not only on PKOs but several other 
international organizations.  By 1980, Deng Xiaoping firmly established his position as 
the leader of the CCP.  The principles he established, particularly on the importance of 
economic reform, have been the guiding philosophy of China’s foreign policy since his 
rise to power.  Three years after his ascent in 1978, China changed its position on the UN 
and adopted a supportive attitude toward the organization.  In regards to peacekeeping, 
China began to vote in favor of various resolutions in the Security Council and pay its 
annual peacekeeping contribution.  What prompted China to change its position towards 
international peacekeeping at the end of 1981?  “This new policy of cooperation resulted 
from changes in China’s domestic politics.”209  Deng recognized that China had to 
economically reform and open its markets to international trade and investment.  This 
change was certainly not isolated to peacekeeping.  Beijing in the 1980s “joined 
practically all important IGOs in the UN system, including the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.”210  Even more revealing was the astonishing 14-fold 
growth in international non-governmental organization membership in 1977 to 1996.211  
Consequently, “the Chinese attitude changed as they saw support for peacekeeping as a 
means of promoting China’s reputation as a responsible major power with a global 
vision.”212  Furthermore, China saw that promoting peacekeeping was a method of 
upholding its image amongst the developing world.  Nevertheless, this policy adjustment 
carried little risk during the 1980s as no new PKOs were established until 1988. 
Both Kim and Zhang argue that the Chinese position changed around 1989.  They 
both downplay the importance of the sweeping increase in the number and types PKOs 
that would arise at the end of the Cold War.  Fravel and other scholars define the new 
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types of PKOs that evolved after 1989 as non-traditional.  The traditional principles of 
peacekeeping were initially recognized through the establishment of the UN Emergency 
Force (UNEF), which was mandated to supervise the truce following the Suez crisis in 
1956.  These guidelines include:  
• The impartiality of the force and its commander.  
• The consent of the host country or belligerent parties. 
• The nonuse of force except in cases of self-defense.  
• Establishment only after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement.   
The traditional model of peacekeeping emphasizes consent and impartiality.  
Alternatively, since 1989, peacekeeping operations have departed from the traditional 
norms.  These new non-traditional norms include: 
• The absence of a political settlement.  
• Without consent of all parties to the conflict. 
• With the authorization to use force. 
• Under national (not UN) command.   
Since the 1980s, China has consistently maintained and endorsed only the 
traditional PKOs by stressing the importance of sovereignty, emphasizing consent and 
impartiality.  Moreover, Chinese officials have consistently upheld Security Council 
approval, in which China has a significant voice due to its permanent seat.  In 1984, in a 
seven-point statement, China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador 
Ling Yufan laid out China’s policy on UN PKOs. 
• Uphold the UN charter and strengthen the role of the UN. 
• PKOs can only be conducted at the request or with the consent of the 
country concerned and with full respect for its independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity. 
• The party concerned should cooperate in the endeavor of PKOs and make 
full use of the time gained and favorable conditions created from such 
operations to seek political settlement of the issue in the question as early 
as possible. 
• Each PKO must have a clearly defined mandate, and no country or party 
should take advantage of PKOs for its self-interests or for interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries. 
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• It is within the competence of the Security Council to authorize PKOs.  In 
the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council, 
general assembly, and secretary-general should assume their respective 
responsibilities as provided for by relevant provisions of the UN charter. 
• The costs of PKOs should be borne by the member states as apportioned 
on the merit of each case in accordance with the principle of fair and 
rational sharing of expenses, or covered by voluntary contributions or 
financing from the countries concerned. 
• For the purposes of strengthening the PKOs of the UN, it is necessary both 
to formulate guidelines and to take practical measures.  The special 
committee on PKOs may proceed with its work in the above two aspects 
simultaneously.213  
Thus, in opposition to the argument that China altered its position in 1989, one 
must conclude that the rise of non-traditional PKOs did not force a revision of China’s 
longstanding cautious and skeptical approach to UN intervention but merely highlighted 
it.  In practice, the Chinese delegation to the Security Council has always opposed the 
establishment or modification of peacekeeping operations that departed from the 
traditional model.  The Chinese record of voting exemplified this by abstaining from the 
following operations:  
• Former Yugoslavia.  Although originally in favor of UNPROFOR, China 
opposed alterations to the mandate invoking Chapter VII, including 
protection of humanitarian relief, the tightening of the embargo, and the 
establishment no-fly zones.  China abstained from resolution 770, 776, 
781, 787, 816, and 820, which all involved a shift towards non-traditional 
aspects of peacekeeping. 
• Rwanda.  China opposed and abstained in voting Resolution 929, because 
it moved away from the traditional model of peacekeeping represented by 
(UNAMIR).  Although China condemned the loss of life, China resisted 
the Security Council’s call for stronger measures. 
• Haiti.  China opposed to Resolution 940 because the use of force to 
restore President Aristide “does not conform with the principles enshrined 
in the UN Charter.”214 
In 1999, not only did China abstain in the voting on UN Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolutions for PKOs, as had been the pattern when it disapproved, but rejected the 
NATO led campaign against Serbia.  From the beginning of the crisis, China’s initial 
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priority was to resist UN involvement in what it dubbed a domestic dispute, despite the 
obvious regional security and humanitarian implications.  Concerned that NATO, as the 
situation worsened, was marginalizing the UN, China demanded that the Security 
Council remain involved.  China vocally opposed what appeared to be NATO’s 
avoidance of the UN and insisted that the international organization remain the 
centerpiece of the solution.  When the “Rambouillet” negotiations failed and NATO 
began its air operations on 24 March 1999, the Chinese were enraged and objected on 
three conditions.  First, China objected to foreign involvement in domestic ethnic 
disputes for humanitarian reasons.  Second, the UN had been bypassed when NATO 
unilaterally acted.  Third, military force had been employed to advance these goals.   
Throughout the Kosovo Crisis Xinhua, Beijing Review, China Daily, Renmin 
Ribao, and Liaowang commentaries and editorials went on a rampage.215  They decreed 
“US-led NATO” actions as pre-meditated, illegitimate, hegemonic, and ultimately set a 
dangerous precedent that had enormous implications for Chinese security.  The 
precarious standard set by NATO in Kosovo openly demonstrated China’s exposed nerve 
in regards to its long held interpretation of sovereignty.  The paradigm established by 
NATO in Kosovo demonstrated to the Chinese how easily a foreign power could justify, 
on simple human rights or humanitarian concerns, intervention into their domestic 
concerns.  Furthermore, the strategic ambiguity proclaimed by the United States in 
regards to Taiwan represents a significant threat that not only would the United States 
and its allies would interfere in Taiwan, but may also assist in other separatists 
movements in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang.  
Thus, while some authors argue that the Kosovo crisis exemplifies China’s 
position changed in regards to peacekeeping because of Chinese increasingly perilous 
security situation throughout the decade, what really changed was the type of PKOs, from 
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traditional to non-traditional.  Kosovo was by definition a non-traditional PKO and 
therefore, in conformity with China’s previously established policy, was opposed 
vociferously.  Nevertheless, if China did modify its policy, it certainly does not explain 
why China assigned military observers to PKOs in November of 1989 and offered its 
greatest contribution to date in the UN effort in Cambodia in 1992.  In both instances, 
China’s participation demonstrates its continued desire, particularly after the 1989 
“Tiananmen Square Incident,” to enhance its international reputation and desire to engage 
the world.  This initial participation in PKOs has been followed by several subsequent 
operations with limited numbers.  In sum, from 1989 to 2000, China has filled 532 UN 
peacekeeping slots with military personnel and civilian police for nine missions.216  
However, Chinese participation in all nine missions and support for other UN PKOs has 
adhered to the same principles established and constantly re-addressed since 1981. 
C. EAST TIMOR 
“In contrast to the Kosovo case, China’s statements on East Timor were few in 
number, brief in length, and modest in tone.”217  China’s reaction to East Timor, which 
occurred just six months after Kosovo, is a recent indication of its continued adherence to 
the policy established under “Dengism.”  East Timor received little media attention in 
China, due to its conformance with traditional norms of peacekeeping.  Shen Guofeng, 
China’s permanent deputy representative to the UN confirmed this position in September 
of 1999.  He is quoted in regards to East Timor as stating: “When the Security Council 
discussed this draft resolution, China paid close attention to two points: First, the 
peacekeeping action of the multinational force should be authorized by the UN, and 
second, when carrying out tasks, the multinational force should cooperate with 
Indonesia.”218  The international response to East Timor clearly did not challenge China’s 
core principles on UN, and it appears that these policies will continue to guide China’s 
policies into the future. 
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China did send civilian police officers to East Timor.  Although this was a 
positive demonstration of China’s flexibility of participating in PKOs, it certainly did not 
indicate willingness to lead or send large numbers of PLA troops to contribute to a 
Southeast Asian PKO.  Even if this were acceptable, there would certainly be some grave 
reservations on the part of the other ASEAN nations, particularly because of their 
concern with China’s regional hegemonism displayed by the assertion of claims to 
sovereignty over the Spratlys and the Paracels.  Thus, even if China demonstrated a 
willingness to participate with a larger number of forces to East Timor, this would have 
been significantly opposed by the Southeast Asian nations.  Furthermore, what must be 
addressed now are the limitations of the PLA to deploy and sustain themselves at a 
significant distance from the Chinese mainland. 
D. MILITARY LIMITATIONS 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) does not lack numbers of personnel nor 
equipment which may be appropriate for PKOs.  However, the PLA, despite attempts 
since 1985 have a significant inability to deploy and sustain themselves at great distances 
and for lengthy periods.219  The PLA is currently in the midst of a fundamental change 
under a military strategy called “high-tech national defense strategy.”  This 
transformation is an attempt to close the technological gap and concurrently redefine the 
strategy and doctrine in which the PLA will fight.  Central to this change is both the PLA 
Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF).  While both these services have received 
increases in spending to allow the PLA to expand its capability to defend in depth, after 
seventeen years of attempting to modernize the Chinese have yet to procure sufficient 
equipment to meet the demands of this recent change in doctrine.  Nevertheless, China 
has demonstrated some capabilities by deploying Chinese ships on overseas port visits 
and developed specialized units, like the Marine Corps, which may be appropriate in a 
future peacekeeping operation. 
In 1979, the PLAN reestablished a marine unit in its South Sea Fleet after a two-
decade absence.  This later became the First Marine Brigade.  According to Ji, “This 
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formation underlined the emphasis on flashpoint conflict rather than a large-scale landing 
operation.  This is why the training of the brigade has been heavily influenced by the US 
and Israeli marine programs.”220  
The unit has a brigade/battalion/company structure with about 5000 soldiers.221  
Although Ji proclaims the PLAN marines are supported by both fixed-wing and rotary-
wing aircraft that provide fire support and assault support, these numbers are extremely 
limited.  The PLAN marines have an extremely limited capability to make a large-scale 
vertical assault when an amphibious assault is untenable.  Furthermore, without a carrier, 
the Chinese marines do not have aviation fire support beyond the combat radius of PLAN 
aircraft operating from the mainland.  The PLAN marines do however possess a robust 
assortment of amphibious tanks (T-63) and mortars to provide organic fire support.  
Nonetheless, this equipment is useless if it cannot be deployed to where it is needed.   
One main weak point of the marines is their limited amphibious lift 
capabilities.  The majority of their 700 landing craft are small and 
incapable of open-ocean navigation.  Many of [the] 55 large and medium 
ships are more than 40 years old, left behind by the Nationalist navy in 
1949.  Only since the late 1980s has China made the effort to build LSTs 
and LSMs with displacement of more than 2200 tonnes.  But the number 
is so small that it is far from adequate to support sustained open-ocean 
operations.222 
While the short and long term prospects appear that the PLAN marines will be 
strengthened, it will not be able to conduct large-scale, distant or lengthy deployments in 
the near future.  Consequently, without the PLAN to deploy peacekeepers overseas an 
evaluation of the PLAAF is required. 
In parallel with the recognition of the limits of the PLAN, the PLAAF has 
received similar emphasis to modernize.  For the purposes of this chapter, this section 
will evaluate China’s capability to deploy and sustain a large-scale peacekeeping force 
utilizing strategic airlift.  With over 470,000 officers and men and about 5,000 aircraft, 
the PLAAF is one of the largest in the world.223  A subgroup of the PLAAF, departing 
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from the norm of most militaries, is the Chinese paratroop units.  Currently the 15th Corps 
is the PLA’s only airborne unit at the army level.  However, the elevation of the 15th 
Corps to the status of a strategic force is indicative of the importance of this unit and of 
prioritization for modernization.  Currently, the 15th Corps claims to have the acquired 
capability of airdropping at one time with more than 10,000 soldiers with light tanks and 
self-propelled guns.224  While the 15th Corps is the most rapid response unit in the PLA, 
for both internal and external missions, it is severely limited by the available airlift and 
accompanying close air support at lengthy distances from China.  To rectify this 
situation, China has purchased large transport planes from Russia to provide both troop 
movement and aerial refueling.  However, according to Jane’s, as of 8 January 2002, 
China has yet to receive any of the four Il-76s it has purchased.225  Thus, while able to 
project a large number of both troops and equipment, the PLA is currently restricted in its 
capability to provide a large-scale peacekeeping force to a location in Southeast Asia.   
E. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE 
As of March 2002, China has 51 observers, 65 police officers, and 1 soldier 
participating in UN PKOs, placing it 45th in countries participating.226  Demonstrating 
some flexibility on its policy, China has recently established and expanded training 
programs for peacekeepers in China.227  However, this is recognition by the Chinese 
leadership that China must continually entwine itself in the international environment.  
Nonetheless, the limited Chinese participation is mostly symbolic and certainly does not 
indicate a significant shift in the two-decade old policy.  This static adherence to a 
classical definition of sovereignty confronts the Chinese with a dilemma in today’s global 
economy.  In fact, in the words of an authoritative Chinese analyst, “the principle of non-
intervention must be further strengthened not weakened.”228  While Beijing maintains its 
absolute interpretation of sovereignty, and continues to support the preservation of the 
                                                 
224 Ibid., 146. 
225 Jane’s found online at www.janes.com. 
226 United Nations Peacekeeping homepage found online at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home_bottom.htm. 
227 “China Begins Training Peacekeeping Police,” Hong Kong Tongxun She in Chinese 10 Jun 99, 
FBIS Document ID: FTS19990612000440. 
228 Linbo Jin, “The Principle of Non-Intervention in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Chinese Perspective,” 
in David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts eds., Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-
Pacific, (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000) 56. 
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UN’s state-centric structure, it diminishes China ability to integrate into the increasingly 
interdependent world.  Ultimately, Beijing’s paradoxical views and policies on PKOs 
must adapt as the 21st century’s interpretation of sovereignty evolves.  While political 
restraints, both domestically and regionally, prevent the PLA from participating in a 
leadership role in a regional PKO, its significant military limitations make this an 
absolute impossibility barring significant international support.  As a result, the 
likelihood is infinitesimal—assuming the United States would not interfere—that China 
would fulfill the third characteristic of the East Timor Model (ETM) as a responsible 














































The United States has sought a willing actor to carry a larger share of the burden 
to maintain Southeast Asian security and stability—without diminishing its regional 
leadership role—since it subsumed the position from the British after WWII.  However, 
as NATO, the UN, and other international organizations have demonstrated, the United 
States is obliged to accept a larger portion of the costs of providing the public good of 
international security and economic stability while simultaneously upholding national 
interests.  Hegemonic stability theory was developed and proposed by Charles 
Kindleberger in a book written about the 1930s global economic crisis.  He suggested 
that the global hegemon must bear a disproportionate cost of maintaining a stable global 
economy, while allowing smaller states to free ride.  In Southeast Asia, where post-
colonial states such as Indonesia are narrowly avoiding disintegration, the United 
States—the existing regional hegemon—must recognize its responsibility to carry a 
disproportionate share of the costs to maintain stability in a region often regarded as 
unimportant in Eurocentric U.S. policy circles.  If the United States endeavors to utilize 
the East Timor Model (ETM) as a policy approach in a future peacekeeping scenario, it 
may well find itself marginalized by another country that accepts the leadership role to 
promote its own interests by challenging the current regional system.  Further, the United 
States will fulfill the prophecy accepted by Southeast Asian states that U.S. policy is 
often reactive and ad hoc towards the region.  Nevertheless, this thesis has demonstrated 
that there is not a willing and capable actor to fulfill the third characteristic of the ETM 
and therefore eager to challenge the current system.  Consequently, without U.S. 
leadership, absent a UN force capable of quickly deploying a peacekeeping force to a 
rapidly deteriorating situation, or in the absence of a regional actor able to intervene, it is 
implausible that a crisis may be resolved without unacceptable humanitarian costs and 
possible escalation.  
The region’s largest indigenous powers, China and Japan, as demonstrated by this 
thesis, are currently unwilling to hastily alter the current status quo for individual national 
interests.  Consequently, both these countries are willing to accept the role of the United 
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States as the regional hegemon, as long as it supports their present interests.  However, it 
must be assumed that if China or Japan accept a greater role by leading a legitimate PKO, 
they would do so only in their national interests.  Consequently, these interests—even 
those of our ally Japan—may not converge with those of the United States.  The result 
would likely challenge and change the system the United States has maintained since 
1945. 
ASEAN, and its outgrowth ARF, is an “imitation community”229 and, as 
demonstrated by this thesis, specifically by their handling of the East Timor crisis in 
1999, is not yet prepared to move onto Stage III of the ARF Concept Paper—conflict 
resolution.  A more plausible leadership scenario for ASEAN would be to direct an 
extraregional PKO, such as a South Asian or Northeast Asian situation.  However, 
ASEAN, like the other countries analyzed in this thesis is not at this time militarily 
prepared to accept such as role.  Until the members of ASEAN consolidate their states’ 
grasp of legitimate power and ease the burdens of internal security issues, their militaries 
will continue to be focused inward.  Although U.S. allies, Thailand the Philippines, and 
Malaysia have shown promise as peacekeepers and promoters of human rights, it is 
obvious after INTERFET, that this would occur only under the leadership of the United 
States. 
Australia—as ostensibly demonstrated in East Timor—presents the best hope to 
fulfill the third characteristic of the ETM.  However, as this thesis and many scholars 
have articulated, INTERFET was led by Australia for domestic political reasons, and 
therefore Australia did not accept a de facto “deputy” role as assumed by some in the 
United States.  Consequently, it is unlikely that a future PKO in Southeast Asia—one 
which likely requires a significantly large amount of troops, equipment and funding—
would provide analogous incentives for Australia to automatically accept a comparable 
leadership role in future PKO.  It is reasonable, however, to assume that Australia would 
contribute a significant portion of the forces to a future crisis.  Nonetheless, it is overly 
idealistic and unfathomable that Australia, a country of barely 20 million inhabitants, 
could lead an operation in which Indonesia disintegrated.   
                                                 
229 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith. 
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This thesis has demonstrated the East Timor Model (ETM) is a flawed policy 
approach, predominantly because the third characteristic of the model cannot be fulfilled 
without a change to the regional system maintained by the United States since 1945.  
Therefore, this thesis recommends the model be adjusted to reflect the actual regional 
conditions in Southeast Asia.  Thus, characteristic three must be modified to reflect the 
United States’ aspiration to have regional actors play a larger role and contribute a larger 
burden of the costs to maintain the current system, while America continues to lead and 
fulfill the responsibility of regional hegemon.  The modified model must encourage and 
pressure Japan, China, ASEAN, and Australia to accept proportionate costs, while the 
United States retains its leadership role and the primacy of its interests.  When the United 
States no longer is willing to accept the responsibility to lead as the regional hegemon, 
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